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This dissertation is an empirical study of the role of financial development (FD) 
in promoting economic growth (EG) through the channel of Total Factor of Productivity 
(TFP).  It seeks to contribute to the literature on the FD-TFP-EG nexus and the 
determinants of total factor productivity by focusing on firm-level data in China.    
 China has experienced a high annual growth rate, especially since the initiation of 
the Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978.  Its remarkable performance since then has 
received much attention and deserves further investigation in its own right.  Given the 
increasing availability of data and the increasing role of China in the world economy, a 
number of case studies of China have been conducted to discover the sources of its 
economic growth.  Some of the studies have credited significant proportions of China’s 
spectacular growth to factor accumulation and TFP improvement.  Because of the 
diminishing role of capital formation, increase in the TFP level becomes the key for 
sustainable growth (Chow, 1993; Mao and Koo, 1997 among others).   
 To better understand TFP, a plethora of researchers have studied the determinants 
of total factor productivity in China (Zheng et al., 1998, 2003; Jin et al., 2001).  Among 
those determinants, the role of financial development in improving Chinese productivity 
has been overlooked until recently (Liang and Teng, 2006; Shan, 2006).  Meanwhile, 
accompanied by an impressive growth rate, China has implemented numerous reforms
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in the financial sector.  While China’s financial institutions have grown steadily since it 
adopted the Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978 and modernized its banking system, 
China’s emerging financial market started to take off after the formation of stock 
exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai in the early 1990s.  Within a decade, China’s 
financial markets, particularly its equity market, developed significantly.  Since the 
passage of the Securities Law in 1999, the stock market in China has played a more 
robust role in the nation’s economy by helping raise the capital, increasing investment 
and improving the efficiency of the overall financial system (Xiao, 2004, 2009).  
Meanwhile, its banking sector adopted numerous reforms to transition into the modern 
banking era.  Guillaumont et al. (2006), Zhang et al. (2007), and Tan (2006) among 
others explore the role of financial development in productivity improvement in China.  
However, most of those FD-TFP-EG nexus studies in China focus mainly on aggregate 
country data or provincial data.       
 Among the micro level studies, those that link firm TFP to financial development 
are limited.  Three recent studies have examined the relationship between finance and 
TFP at the firm level.  Du and Girma (2008) explore the relationship between financing 
source (formal or informal) and firm growth measured by both firm-level TFP and firm-
level employment in China.  Using survey data from around 2,400 Chinese firms 
(including both listed and non-listed firms), Ayyagari et al. (2008) compare informal 
financing sources with formal financing sources.  They use sales growth, productivity 
growth (defined as sales minus total material cost divided by total number of workers), 
and the firm’s reinvestment rate (the manager’s estimate of percentage of net profits that 
are reinvested in the establishment) to measure firm performance.  Du et al. (2009) find 
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that access to debt and equity is important for firm growth.  However, none of these 
studies focus on the listed firms in China, relate a firm’s financial development level to 
its productivity level, or study the linkage between a firm’s financial structure and other 
firm characteristics and its productivity level. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study  
This dissertation studies the role of financial development in firm level growth in 
China.  The purpose of this study is threefold.   
1.  To examine the effects of financial development on economic growth through 
the channel of total factor productivity (TFP) at firm level using listed firms in China.  
Positive results have been found between financial development and economic growth at 
the aggregate level (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; 
Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004), but what are the micro-driving forces of the 
economy’s growth?  My study will address this issue and seek to answer those questions.  
To have the correct measurement for firm-level financial development, I focus mainly on 
two of the main functions of financial development in economic growth―to ease 
financial constraints and the access to capital and to improve corporate governance.   
 For the first function (channel), firm-level financial constraints, I use two 
different approaches used in the literature (Kaplan and Zingales, 1995; Cleary, 1999, 
2006; Musso and Schiavo, 2008; Hadlock and Pierce, 2009) to create two indices in order 
to predict the financial constraint level for Chinese listed firms.  Then I use one of the 
traditional measures for the financial constraint level of a firm size and age (Devereux 
and Schiantarelli, 1990; Chrisinko and Schaller, 1995; Gilchris and Himmelberg, 1995; 
Whited, 2006) to find out the relationship between a firm’s financial constraints and its 
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TFP level.  For the second function (channel), corporate governance, financial structure 
(capital structure) and ownership structure are used as proxies.  Financial structure is 
measured by the debt-to-asset ratio, while the ownership structure includes both 
ownership concentration and ownership category.  These structures are critical elements 
defining a firm’s corporate governance structure.     
 To estimate the firm-level TFP, a nonparametric approach by Good, et al. (1996) 
is chosen over both parametric and semi-parametric methods (Olley and Pakes, a.k.a. OP, 
1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, a.k.a. LP, 2003).  Multilateral TFP Index Number (IN) 
approaches to measuring productivity growth do not rely on direct estimation of 
underlying technology, nor do they require econometric specification and estimation of 
technology.  Like other non-parametric methods, no specified form of production 
function or assumed distribution form of residuals is needed by IN approaches, and is 
better in coping technologies that involve multi-input and multi-output; therefore it fits a 
transition economy like China (Guillaumont et al., 2006). The Chinese economy, like 
other transition economies shows characteristics of both market imperfections and 
distortions.  In addition, in a transition economy, large variation in production 
technologies is observed across firms due to different ownership structures, degrees of 
openness, or multiple technologies at different production cycles. 
2.  To explore the relationship between some firm characteristics and the firm-
level TFP.  Firm specifics that are examined include the capital intensity ratio and the 
export orientation.  As a robustness check, the association between financial constraints 
and TFP and between financial structure and TFP are also studied in subsamples 
according to industry, tradable- share, and state-share ownership.    
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 3.  To examine the effects of the stock market liberalization on firm-level TFP.  In 
the year 2001-2002, some milestones were reached in the financial sector in China.  In 
February of 2001, domestic investors were permitted to purchase B shares if they used 
foreign currencies rather than Chinese currency (RMB), but they were not allowed to 
remit B share investment funds abroad without permission.  In June, 2001, a plan to 
reduce the number of non-tradable shares held by state entities was revealed, causing a 
drop of 500 points in the market over the next three months.  The market continued to fall 
over the next 4 years, one reason being the surplus of tradable shares that the market 
could absorb.  In 2002, the QFII
1
 scheme was introduced mainly to allow qualified 
foreign institutional investors to tap into the tradable A-share market that had previously 
been open only to domestic investors.  In the early 1990s, stock market liberalization 
occurred in many emerging economies, and a number of studies ensued.  However, 
China’s situation was different from other emerging economies due to the market’s 
gradual opening with certain restrictions.  Good or bad, the QFII scheme shows a big step 
towards financial liberalization.  In addition, according to the WTO agreement
2
, China’s 
banking sector would be more open to foreign banks within 5 years and those large 
foreign banks would be able to be strategic partners with  major state-owned banks.  In 
2002, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the Central Huijin 
Investment Company were set up to better monitor banking activities and restructuring 
and prepare for the IPOs
3
 of state-owned banks.  Studies show that financial liberalization 
has a positive impact on TFP level, so in this study, we will control for the period 2002- 
2004 to capture the effects of the opening up in the financial sector. 
                                                           
1
 QFII: Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. 
2
 China formally became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 
3
 IPO: Initial Public Offering. 
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1.3 Contribution  
This study attempts to fill the gap in firm-level studies of the role of financial 
development in total factor productivity in China.  To my knowledge, it is the first 
attempt to link firm-level financial development and economic growth through firm- 
level TFP using listed Chinese firms.  Publicly-listed firms in China are the best 
companies for studying the impact of financial development measured by a combination 
of financial intermediaries and financial markets because only those firms can borrow 
from financial intermediaries or raise funds through equity markets.  
 The study also provides the first empirical evidence from China on the 
relationship between a firm’s total factor productivity level and its corporate governance 
(including its financial structure) and other firm characteristics.  For financial structure, 
the bigger question is which financial system (bank- or market-based) is better at 
resource allocation.  Some argue that markets and venture capitalists are better funding 
those riskier yet more profitable projects if they are successful.  Others emphasize that 
financial intermediaries are better in reducing asymmetric information that will influence 
financing decisions (Levine, 2004).  The implication behind studying the nexus between 
a firm’s financial structure and its productivity is that firms that engage in more 
innovative activities usually hold more intangible assets such as patents, and R&D-
related human capital.  The differences in the tendency to innovate are likely translated 
into different TFP levels (Griliches and Lichtenberg, 1984).  In corporate finance theory, 
two sides of the story are being told.  On one hand, theories that emphasize bankruptcy 
costs, control rights, and conflicts of interests between equity and debt holders suggest 
that firms with more intangible assets are more likely to rely on equity financing (Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995).  On the other hand, theories 
based on agency costs and information asymmetries suggest that equity financing is 
subject to severe under pricing in firms holding more intangible assets, hence preferring 
debt financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  The existing empirical evidence also points in 
two opposite directions.  The current study will add to the literature with country 
evidence at the micro-level.
4
  If the results show that firms’ leverage ratio is negatively 
associated with their TFP levels, it might become indirect evidence that firms tend to 
have higher levels of productivity in market-based financial systems.  The significance of 
this study also lies in its policy implications for the future development of China’s 
financial sector, especially the equity market.  As mentioned earlier, in 2001, China 
adopted a policy of converting more non-tradable shares into tradable shares and 
allowing more international institutional investors to invest in A-share markets 
(denominated in domestic currency RMB).  While the effects of this policy are still being 
evaluated, since 2005 the Chinese government has been considering enhancing the 
capacity of more private and small firms to raise equity funds.  In addition, the indices 
that are created using Chinese listed firms can provide a way for the government to 
predict which firms will be more or less financially constrained and that information will 
help the parties involved determine who needs more funds and who does not. 
 The current study also provides important information for similar research in 
other transitional economies.  Further, it echoes Kehoe and Prescott (2002), who call for 
more micro studies in future research: “absent careful micro studies at firm and industry 
levels, we can only conjecture as to what these (good and bad) policies are” (p.16).  In 
addition, from an econometrics point of view, TFP analysis at firm level avoids the 
                                                           
4
 Possible endogeneity issues will be addressed in later chapters. 
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potential aggregation bias from country- or industry-level data (Arnold et al., 2007). 
 The remainder of the study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 introduces the 
background of the financial system in China, the banking sector and financial market 
development in the last few decades since the Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978.  
Chapter 3 discusses the literature on the FD-EG nexus, the link between TFP and 
financial development, the channels through which financial development can impact 
TFP level, and FD-TFP-EG studies in China.  Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical model 
that links FD and TFP, the literature on methodologies to measure TFP and financial 
development at the firm level, data source and variable construction, and the empirical 
models to estimate the impact of financial development on firm-level TFP.  Chapter 5 






 This chapter provides some background information on the financial development 
in China.  Since the adoption of the Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978, China has 
witnessed fundamental changes and a lot of which have been in its financial sector.  A 
centrally planned economy in which the government acted as the only agent for domestic 
allocation of capital has developed into a transition economy where the financial system 
has experienced the modernization of the banking sector, the emergence of equity 
markets, and the adoption of market institutions as regulatory bodies. 
2.1 Overview of the Financial Development in China 
 Financial development usually refers to “the factors, policies, and institutions that 
lead to effective financial intermediaries and markets as well as deep and broad access to 
capital and financial services.” (p.3, Roubini and Bilodeau, 2009).  China’s financial 
system has developed tremendously since 1978.  Over the years, the government has 
embarked on a series of reforms, many of them co-occurring with the privatization of the 
financial sector.  Currently, China’s financial sector consists of banks, non-bank financial 
intermediaries, and financial markets, as in many other advanced economies; and the real 
monetary balance has expanded with the economic growth.  China’s financial depth 
measured by the M2/GDP ratio increased from 24% in 1978 to 80% in 1990, and all the 
way to 182 percent in 2004 (Table 1).  One of the explanations for this change is the 
expansion of household financial savings.  The majority of these pooled savings 
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have been channeled into banks, which provided more than 85% of total funds raised by 
the real sector to support GDP activities in 2006 (People’s Bank of China, 2006).  Table 1 
shows that the loans to GDP ratio increased from 0.76 in 1990 to 1.76 in 2004.  It is 
obvious that China’s financial system is still a bank-based system, which consists of 




Yuan :RMB) M2/GDP Loans/GDP Deposits/GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
1990 18547.90 0.820 0.953 0.755 0.055 
1991 21617.80 0.900 0.987 0.836 0.055 
1992 26638.10 0.954 0.988 0.881 0.060 
1993 34634.40 1.007 0.951 0.855 0.060 
1994 46759.40 1.004 0.873 0.866 0.065 
1995 58478.10 1.039 0.864 0.921 0.057 
1996 67884.60 1.121 0.901 1.010 0.063 
1997 74462.60 1.222 1.006 1.106 0.098 
1998 78345.20 1.334 1.104 1.221 0.109 
1999 82067.50 1.461 1.130 1.325 0.119 
2000 89468.10 1.505 1.111 1.384 0.109 
2001 97314.80 1.627 1.154 1.476 0.109 
2002 105172.30 1.759 1.248 1.625 0.100 
2003 117390.20 1.885 1.354 1.772 0.100 
2004 136875.90 1.856 1.302 1.764 0.090 
Notes: 
 
1. Definitions: M2= money plus quasi-money; private credit=sum of credits to private-owned 
enterprises, township enterprises, the self-employed enterprises, and the enterprises with foreign 
funds. 
2. Data Sources: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1992-2007) by Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking Editor Board, and China Statistical Yearbook (1992-2004).     
 
state-owned banks (hereafter SOBs); commercial banks owned by both state and private 
investors; credit cooperatives; foreign banks; nonbank financial institutions  such as 
investment and leasing companies; and other entities such as securities, asset 
management, and insurance companies (Maswana, 2008). 
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While banking has always been the main source for enterprise finance, the 
Chinese government has also tried to expand financing by channeling funds via the 
development of stock markets.  After a trial period in the late 1970s, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were established in 1991 and 1992 respectively.  Later, the 
Companies Law in 1993 and the Securities Law in 1998 built a legitimate platform for 
issuance of equity (OECD 2002).  Since then, the Chinese stock market has taken off, 
helping more companies raise capital both at home and abroad.  It is beginning to play a 
more important role in the Chinese economy by easing capital constraints, promoting 
trade, and providing more liquidity and a better allocation of capital.   
 To keep a balance among the pace of market-based financial reforms, the 
sustained growth targets, and the government-directed public component, regulation of 
the system has become a key issue.  Numerous regulatory bodies oversee the financial 
institutions and markets.  PBOC, as the central bank in China, conducts monetary policy 
and oversees the payment system, while the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) sets macroeconomic policies.  The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), and China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) are the main multiple agencies to regulate the 
overall financial structure of the system (Ji, 2006). 
2.2 The Banking Development in China 
 In the early 1980s, China abandoned its mono-banking system where the People’s  
Bank of China (PBC) acted as a one-for-all financial institution in the Chinese economy, 
and this move resulted in a series of financial reforms.  Since then, the PBC still functions 
as the central bank, but China’s banking is concentrated round three policy banks and the 
12 
 
Big Four state-owned banks (SOBs).  The Big Four banks are the Bank of China, the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the China 
Construction Bank.  Those four banks represent 60-70% of domestic banks’ total assets 
and traditionally focus on financing trade, industry, infrastructure, and rural development 
respectively.  In 1994, three policy banks were established during the banking reform to 
relieve the Big Four of their state-directed lending role.  They are the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China, which raises funds for agricultural development projects in 
rural areas; the China Development Bank, which is responsible for financing 
infrastructure such as funding for the Three Gorges Dam project; and the Export-Import 
Bank of China, which specializes in financing trade.      
 The enactment of the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law in 1995 
built a foundation for a modern banking system that is more competitive and efficient.  
According to the Commercial Banking Law, financial institutions need to incorporate 
commercial criteria into their lending practices, which frees the remaining SOBs from 
policy-oriented lending.  Therefore, from national policies that stressed only the 
importance of how to determine the bank credit allocation, to the modernization of 
lending and risk management practices, China’s banking sector has experienced a huge 
improvement, especially in terms of quality.  Gradually, domestic loans, which take the 
place of state budget outlays, have become the main external source for financing capital 
investments.  By the mid 2000s, only about 10 percent of state-owned companies’ total 
funding is from the state budget (Allen et al., 2005). 
The improvement in loan quality does not mean that there are no residual 
problems from those old days.  The Chinese government has been fighting to reduce its 
13 
 
non-performing loan (NPL) level.  Asset Management Corporations (AMC) were set up 
in 1999 to reduce the NPL level for each of the Big Four.  According to Maswana (2008), 
by 2005, NPL reduction and capital injection into the Big Four banks cost the 
government nearly 250 billion U.S. dollars yet at the end of 2005, the NPLs of all 
Chinese commercial banks still amounted to about 8 percent of China’s 2005 GDP. 
 The late 1990s also witnessed the growth of institutional investors.  Foreign 
institutional investors have been allowed to invest in Chinese banks since 1996.  After 
China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001, further participation of foreign banks in China 
and more bank competition was expected (Allen et al., 2005; Gullaumont Jeanneney et 
al., 2007).  In 2007, 35 overseas banks had gained stakes in 23 Chinese banks with 
investments worth 21 billion U.S. dollars.  Total assets of overseas banks in China 
reached 153.9 U.S. dollars by the end of October 2007 (Xinhua Agency, 2007).  
 Table 1 above also shows other main financial development indicators measured 
by financial intermediaries.  The ratio of loans by financial intermediaries to GDP 
increased from 0.95 in 1990 to 1.3 in 2004.  The Private Credit-to-GDP ratio, which is 
normally used to measure a country’s financial development, also improved from 0.05 in 
1990 to 0.09 in 2004.  Here “private credit” specifically refers to the sum of credit to 
private-owned enterprises, township village enterprises
5
, enterprises of the self-
employed, and enterprises with foreign funds.  Even though these four groups represent a 
small proportion of GDP, they are a dynamic component and play an important and vital 
role in the economy.  The expansion of credits to these groups shows that China is  
 
                                                           
5
 Township-village enterprises (TVEs) are those enterprises that are located in rural areas (townships and 
villages), usually collectively-owned or with most of their investment from residents in these rural areas. 
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continuing its efforts to build a sound financial system that channels funds to firms with  
different ownership structures. 
2.3 The Stock Market Development in China 
2.3.1 The Emergence of the Stock Market and State-Owned Enterprise Reforms 
 In addition to China’s large banking sector, and developing at the same time, are 
stock markets, bond markets, and futures markets, especially the stock market.  Along 
with the banking sector reform, the biggest change in the financial market was the 
inception of two stock exchanges in the early 1990s.  The Shanghai (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen (SZSE) stock exchanges were established to provide firms with additional 
fund-raising sources.  The Chinese government encouraged the development of stock 
markets in order to mobilize the increasing household savings, and but stock markets can 
hedge against inflation (Rousseau and Xiao, 2007).  The growth in China’s stock market 
reflects the government’s view that well-functioning exchanges could help successfully 
restructure those unproductive and unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(Mookerjee and Yu, 1999).  The privatization and listing of SOEs, an integral part of 
China’s state enterprise reform, was the result of changes in socio-political ideologies and 
mainly the increasing need for capital.  This part of the reform has two unique 
characteristics: 1. new capital is raised when listing takes place, and 2. the state retains 
voting control in the firm, although it claims to leave decision-making to the managers.  
Regardless, in order to attract funds and technologies, SOEs need to be less dependent on 
subsidized state loans, and that means they need to improve corporate governance and 
firm performance.  The enactment of the Companies Law in 1993 and the Securities Law 
in 1998 (both of which were revised in 2005) formally established the “legal” platform 
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for issuance of equity (OECD, 2005) and corporate governance of SOEs.  The listing 
process for a firm contains multiple steps: 1. transforming into a shareholding 
corporation; 2. obtaining approval for listing; 3. releasing a prospectus according to the 
international accounting practices and disclosing financial and accounting information; 
and 4. passing the evaluation until the firm is finally listed.    
 Table 2 shows some financial indicators measured by stock market development.  
As we can see, the number of firms listed on the exchange rose from 53 in 1992 to 1377 
by the end of 2004.  At the same time, stock market capitalization grew from 3.9% of 
GDP in 1992 to 53.8% of GDP in 2000 at the peak and was still 27.1% of GDP in 2004 
after a bear market, which drove the Shanghai Index down at one point more than 50% 
(Walter and Howie, 2006).  Table 2 also presents the amount of capital raised 
domestically in the stock market and shows that its ratio to total investment in fixed 
assets grew steadily from 0.59 per cent in 1995 to 4.68 percent in 2000.  Between 2000 
and 2004, the ratio dropped from 4.25% to 1.55% due to the bear market from 2001 to 
2004.  In addition, the late 1990s saw a growing number of institutional investors in the 
banking sector, but also in the stock market.  Beginning in 1998, more effort was made to 
broaden the market beyond the existing “institutional” investors, most of whom were 
SOEs.  As a result, there is an increasing presence of both open- and closed-end funds, 
gray market money managers, insurance companies, and pension funds, in addition to 
16 
 









































1992     53 1088  3.9 - - - -         - 
1993   183 3531 10.2   314.54 13072.3 2.41 
1994   291 3691 7.9 969 2.1 138.05 17042.1 0.81 
1995   323 3474 5.9 938 1.6 118.86 20019.3 0.59 
1996   530 9842 14.5 2867 4.2 341.52 22913.5 1.49 
1997   745 17529 23.5 5204 7.0 933.82 24941.1 3.74 
1998   851 19506 24.9 5746 7.3 803.57 28406.2 2.83 
1999   949 26471 32.3 8314 10.0 897.39 29475.2 3.04 
2000 1088 48091 53.8 16088 18.0 1541.02 32917.7 4.68 
2001 1160 43522 44.7 14463 14.9 1182.13 27826.6 4.25 
2002 1224 38329 36.4 12485 11.9 779.75 32942 2.37 
2003 1287 42458 36.2 13179 11.2 823.1 55118 1.49 
2004 1377 37056 27.1 11689 8.5 862.67 55566.6 1.55 
Note: 
 
1. Data Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (1992-2004), China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) (2005), and Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1992-2007). 
 
more than 100 securities companies.  Also, as a part of promises made after China’s entry 
into the WTO in 2001, China will continue to gradually liberalize its stock market 
including converting more non-tradable shares into tradable shares and allowing more 
foreign capital in tradable A-shares rather than B, H, or N shares.  On November 8, 2002, 
CSRC and PBOC jointly introduced a program called QFII, which for the first time 
allowed qualified foreign institutional investors to tap into the tradable A-share market.  
Though there are a number of restrictions, including a quota and a holding period, QFII 
indicates that China is a step closer towards liberalizing the stock market liberalization, as  




2.3.2 Corporate Ownership Structure 
The background introduction is not complete without an explanation of the 
differences among A-, B-, H-, and N-shares or the unique characteristics of Chinese- 
listed firms.  China’s stocks and stock markets, from inception, have reflected a gradual 
approach and can be called equity markets with “Chinese characteristics,” as Walter and 
Howie (2006) put it. 
 In China, the markets are operated by the state, regulated by the state, and 
 legislated by the state, and raise funds for the benefit of the state by selling shares 
 in enterprises owned by the state.  In the entire system, the only things that do not 
 belong to the state are the actual money, or capital, put up by presumably   
 individual investors, and the market itself.  These two things, however, represent 
 the heart of a system that, without question, has driven the political process before 
 it. (p.4)         
 A typical publicly-listed firm in China has a mixed ownership structure, with 
three major types of shareholders: the state, legal persons (e.g. institutions), and domestic 
individuals ─each holding about 30 percent of the stock.  If a listed firm does issue 
employee or foreign shares, they usually count for less than 10 percent of the outstanding 
shares.  There are two ways to categorize the shares: first, tradable and non-tradable 
shares and second, shares open to domestic investors or to foreign investors.  Non-
tradable shares are the state shares, the legal person shares, or employee shares.
6
  Until 
2004, 62% of the equity market capitalization of China was represented by the value of 
legally non-tradable shares owned by the state.  The remaining shares are tradable in the 
secondary market.  The tradable shares embody a distinctive segmentation: tradable A-
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  For more introduction to non-tradable shares, please refer to the appendix A. 
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shares, tradable B-shares, and other tradable shares like H- and N-shares.    
 The tradable A-shares are the common stock issued by companies from mainland 
China (PRC), listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and reserved for PRC 
citizens trading in RMB (Chinese currency).  Most of the holders of tradable A-share are 
individuals and some domestic institutions.  There is no restriction on the number of 
shares traded or holding period.  However, when a company makes its initial public 
offering (IPO), at least 25% of its total outstanding shares are required to be tradable A-
shares, the only group of equity that is traded among domestic investors at the two 
exchanges.  Tradable B-shares are available only to foreign investors and some 
authorized domestic securities firms with SHSE B-shares denominated in U.S. dollars 
and SZSE B-shares in Hong Kong dollars.  Other tradable shares are H shares and N-
shares.  H-shares and N-shares are like B-shares except that they are issued and traded at 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange respectively.  N-shares 
are either through IPOs or ADRs.
7
         
 We can also divide shares into two segments.  One segment includes domestic 
shares─non-tradable and tradable A-shares.  The state shares, legal person shares, 
employee shares, and tradable A-shares all belong to this group.  The other segment is 
classified as foreign shares (B- , H- , and N-shares).     
 From the gradual approach and the unique characteristics, one can see that 
privatization has never been the ultimate goal of the Chinese stock market.  To raise 
capital, and to improve management and productivity levels of Chinese firms (who will 
still remain state-owned) are the main objectives.  China only started to reduce the state  
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 ADR: American Depositary Receipt. 
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share holding in 1999 and 2001 (da xiao fei jie jing), a process which later became part of 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
3.1 Financial Development (FD) and Economic Growth (EG) 
3.1.1 Overview 
 To study the channel(s) through which financial development can impact 
economic growth, we need to first look at the relationship between finance and economic 
growth.  The literature on the FD-EG nexus is abundant.  The key issue is whether 
financial development and economic growth are related, and if so, how and to what 
degree. For over a century, this topic has been debated (Levine, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine, 2008).  On one hand, some economists are skeptical about the relationship 
and even ignore the financial sector in economic development discussions (Jones, 2001; 
Weil, 2004).  Economists such as Lucas (1988) think that the role of finance in economic 
growth is overly stressed.  On the other hand, a number of economists do find a 
relationship between finance and economic growth.  De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) 
find that the impact of finance on economic growth is negative while others find it to be 
positive.  Among those who find a positive relationship between finance and economic 
growth there are three mainstream explanations of this relationship. 
1.  Economic growth leads to financial development.  Joan Robinson (1952) 
proposes the “enterprises lead, finance follows” idea, which means that a financial system 
arises only as a passive response to economic development.  Financial development is a 
consequence of economic growth that demands more and better financial services.  This 
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echoes the “demand following” view pointed out by Patrick in his seminal work in 1966.  
“Demand-following” is referred to as “the creation of modern financial institutions, their 
financial assets and liabilities, and related financial services that is in response to the 
demand for these services by investors and savers in the real economy” (p.174). 
2.  Financial development and economic growth have a two-way causality 
relationship.  Demetriades and Hussein (1996) find little systematic evidence to support 
the view that finance is a major factor in the economic growth process.  In addition, they 
find that financial development and economic growth have a two-way causality 
relationship in the majority of the countries they examined, and in some countries 
financial development follows economic growth.  Using a sample of ten less-developed 
countries, Luintel and Khan (1999) also find a two-way causality between financial 
development and output growth for all of the countries in their study.  From time series 
data gathered in Malaysia, Ang and McKibbin (2007) find that the growth of the financial 
sector is a result of the growth of output.
8
       
 3.  Financial development causes economic growth.  Another group of studies 
emphasizes the positive, causal impact of financial development on economic growth.  
Theoretical models show that financial development measured by financial institutions, 
financial markets, and financial instruments may reduce the negative effects of 
information and transaction costs and hence ameliorate market frictions.  Financial 
development can influence the investment rate, technology innovation, and ultimately 
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 Later, B. Bhaskara Rao (2008) shows that when a proper specification for output is used, financial sector 





long-run economic growth rate because incentives and constraints that the economic 
agents face vary under different financial arrangements at various levels of financial 
development (Levine and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008).  Patrick (1996) calls this as “supply-
leading,” which means “the creation of financial institutions and the supply of their 
financial assets, liabilities, and related financial services in advance of demand for them, 
especially the demand of entrepreneurs in the modern, growth-inducing sector” (p.175).  
In their survey, Levine (1997, 2005) and Levine and Demirguc-Kunt (2008) summarize 
the positive functions of a financial system, as part of financial development, in economic 
growth. 
3.1.2 Functions of the Financial System on Economic Growth 
First, both financial intermediaries and the stock market can reduce asymmetric 
information with respect to investment opportunities; hence enhance the efficient 
allocation of capital.  Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) suggest that when shares of firms are 
publicly traded, the larger and more liquid the markets, the more information the stock 
contains.  The more closely the firms tie the manager’s compensation to the stock price, 
the more incentives the managers have to enhance the firm’s performance.  
 Second, a sound financial system can monitor investments and improve corporate 
governance.  Corporate governance is a mechanism through which capital and resources 
are allocated, profits are distributed, and the performance of the corporation is monitored.  
Equity holders or creditors are also willing to provide more funds to firms with effective 
corporate governance, and better governance can promote economic growth.  The threat 
of a corporate takeover in well-functioning stock markets can mitigate the principle-agent 
problem and promote efficient resource allocation and economic growth (Levine and 
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Zervos, 1996).  Models also show that well-functioning financial intermediaries influence 
economic growth through improved corporate governance; they can monitor the firms at 
lower costs through economies of scale (Bencivenga and Smith, 1993). 
Third, a healthy financial system can facilitate trade, manage and diversify risk, 
and increase liquidity.  Financial institutions can transform riskier assets into less risky 
assets through diversifying portfolios to savers.  Stock markets can also extend the time 
for investments by providing liquidity for equity holders.  Risk sharing makes higher 
returns yet riskier investments, leading to more innovative yet riskier projects being 
funded (Levine, 1991; King and Levine, 1993).      
 Fourth, a well-functioning financial system increases saving rates, pools savings, 
and eases the access to capital.  One of the essential functions of the financial system is to 
channel funds.  Well-functioning financial intermediaries and markets can mobilize the 
funds, transferring them from savers to borrowers.  They can stimulate savings, 
entrepreneurship, and specialization.  Without a financial system that pools savings from 
disparate savers for investment, many production processes will be constrained or not 
even get started.  Theories that support this function suggest that stock market 
development should raise the rate of return on savings, hence providing greater incentives 
for savings.  McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) find that negative real interest rates due 
to financial repression reduce incentives to save.  Lower savings result in lower 
investment and economic growth.  Their conclusion is that financial liberalization will 
result in higher interest rates and hence higher saving rates and economic growth.  In 
addition, financial instruments with different levels of denomination that are created by 
the liberalized financial system can provide households with more opportunities to hold 
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diversified portfolios and earn higher returns too.  One of the byproducts of greater 
financial development is the reduction of capital constraints so that more entrepreneurs 
can get funds for more projects that will stimulate economic growth.  
 In sum, the consensus in the literature with regard to the understanding of each 
mechanism through which the financial system could affect the real economy is that 
financial development can positively influence economic growth through increasing 
either the level or efficiency of capital and investments (see Levine 2003, 2005 for a 
review).  One way to measure this efficiency of investments is to measure the TFP 
change ( ).   
3.1.3 Financial Structure and Economic Growth 
Apparently both financial intermediaries and financial markets, as structures of 
the financial system, stimulate the economy through the four functions mentioned above, 
but which one is more important?  At the macro level, a country-specific financial 
structure is referred to as a combination of financial institutions and markets in operation.  
Luintel et al. (2008) provide a good review of financial structure and economic growth.  
At the macro level, there are four theories with regard to the relationship between 
financial structure and economic growth: first, the bank-based theory (Diamond, 1984; 
Stiglitz, 1985; Boyd and Prescott,1986; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; and Stulz, 2002 
among others); second, the market-based theory (Levine,1997; Boyd and Smith,1998; 
and Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993 among others); third, the financial service theory 
(Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997 among others); and fourth, the law and finance 
theory.           
 Bank-based theorists (see Luintel et al., 2008 for a review) usually emphasize the 
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positive role of banks in economic growth while pointing out the shortcomings of a 
market-based financial system.  They think banks are more important than markets in 
economic development and growth (Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; 
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).       
 Market-based theorists, on the other hand, suggest otherwise (Levine, 1997; 
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Boyd and Smith, 1998 among others).  Market-based 
countries do tend to be richer than bank-based countries.  Banks tend to be more 
important in a developing country while in a richer/developed country, markets are 
usually more important.  The financial structure at the macro level (whether a country’s 
financial system is more market-based or bank-based) does correlate with economic 
development, but each type has its own advantages and disadvantages.  The two types of 
financial structures also share a lot in common, and both contribute to the well-
functioning of the whole financial system (Stulz, 2002 among others).  
 Financial service theory mainly emphasizes the financial services provided by 
financial institutions and markets, which are the two main components of a financial 
system.  This theory does not contradict either the bank-based or the market-based 
theory; the key point is that financial institutions and financial markets are not substitutes 
but substitutes (Merton and Bodie, 1995; Levine, 1997, etc.).  In addition, financial 
markets and intermediaries provide different kinds of financial services for economic 
development.          
 Law and finance theorists suggest that it is the overall financial development, not 
the financial structure, which is crucial to economic success at both micro and macro 
level.  They focus on the role of the legal system in promoting economic growth by  
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creating a sound financial sector (La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 1999; Beck et al., 2000). 
3.2 Channels through which FD Impacts EG  
In traditional growth theories of financial development, the role of financial 
development in growth is through factor accumulation, which is considered one of the 
main driving forces behind economic growth.  Financial development can help channel 
funds so as to increase the aggregate saving rate and investment level, but in traditional 
growth models, this role is limited due to diminishing returns of capital.  Also, in 
traditional growth theories, financial development correlates with economic growth 
through level effects (investment and productivity levels for example) rather than through 
growth effects.  Productivity growth is mainly through technical progress, which is 
exogenous (Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). 
The interests in the relationship between financial development, productivity, and 
economic growth rekindled after the emergence of endogenous growth literature 
pioneered by Romer (1986).  In this literature, capital might not suffer from diminishing 
returns because of the endogenous technological change through research and 
development (R&D), plus R&D’s positive externalities on aggregate productivity.  
Financial sector can play an active role in raising productivity either through allocating 
investment funds to projects with higher returns or enhancing technical progress through 
providing important financial resources for R&D activities (see Guillaumont et al., 2006 
for a review).  Several authors suggest that financial development stimulates economic 
growth not only by raising the funds available for factor accumulation but also by 
encouraging productivity growth.  Theoretical papers by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997); 
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and Aghion et al. (2005) among others show that financial development may provide 
innovators with more credit, thereby fostering growth through technical change. 
Empirical evidence has been consistent with theoretical implications.  Numerous 
studies show the effect of development in the financial sector on economic growth and 
the channel(s) through which the financial sector can influence growth.  There are four 
different branches of literature on the relationship among TFP, Economic Growth, and 
Financial Development.  These four groups of empirical studies show how financial 
development impacts economic growth through the TFP () channel. 
First, cross-country aggregate TFP studies focus on heterogeneity in productivity 
levels across countries.  Benhabib and Spiegel (1990) examine whether financial 
development affects growth through its positive contribution to total factor productivity 
growth or only to growth in “primitives” (physical and human capital) or rates of factor 
accumulation.  Their results suggest that financial development is correlated with both 
investment and total factor productivity growth.  King and Levine (1993a, b, c), using 
cross-country data, find that financial development measured by the level of financial 
intermediaries has a positive impact on productivity.  Levine and Zervos (1998) add stock 
market development into the equation and argue that “the major channel through which 
growth is linked to stock markets and banks is through productivity growth” (p.547).  
Beck et al. (2000) find that financial intermediaries have a larger positive impact on total 
factor productivity than they have on investment and savings.  Applying GMM dynamic 
panel techniques to a panel of 74 countries, Rioja and Valev (2004b) find evidence of the 
role of financial development in TFP at various stages of economic growth. 
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Second, cross-country, firm-level, and industry-level TFP studies investigate 
differences in productivity levels among firms and industries across countries.  To further 
understand the FD-TFP-EG relationship, researchers have also employed firm-level and 
industry-level data.  Some researchers address the causality issues and seek to find the 
mechanisms through which finance influences economic growth.  Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) use industry-level data across 41 countries to study the mechanisms through 
which financial development may influence economic growth.  They argue that market 
frictions are the obstacles for firms to get external finance and better-developed financial 
systems can alleviate those frictions.  So, industries that depend more on external finance 
should benefit disproportionately from greater financial development than industries that 
are not heavily reliant on external finance.  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use 
firm-level data and a financial planning model to show that financial systems with larger 
banking systems and more liquid stock markets allow firms to grow faster than the firms 
could finance internally.  In a panel of industries across 38 countries, Tadesse (2005) 
finds that financial development induces technological innovations through capital 
mobilization and risk sharing.  Ayyagari et al. (2007), using a large panel of over 10,000 
firms in 47 developing countries, show that more external finance increases innovation 
and firm dynamism.
9
  This association is in line with the cross-country finding that 
finance promotes growth through the channel of productivity increases (Ayyagari et al., 
2006).  The third group consists of aggregate TFP-level analysis within a country over a 
particular time period.  Jeong and Townsend (2007), in their most recent paper, develop a 
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 In the paper, the authors narrowly define innovation as a firm’s adoption of new technology and 
introduction of new product lines.  The broader definition of innovation takes into account changes in the 
firm’s operations, such as a decision to outsource certain activities or introduce a new product line.  They 
term this broader range of activities as “firm dynamism” to differentiate from core innovation. 
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growth accounting method that decomposes the TFP growth into four components: 
occupational shifts, financial deepening, capital heterogeneity, and sectoral Solow 
residuals.  Occupational shifts and financial deepening on average could explain 75 
percent of the TFP.  Their model assumes that technical change results only from 
improving allocation efficiency, which in turn depends on distribution of wealth and the 
efficiency of the financial system.  A number of country studies employ Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) methodologies using aggregate time series data to study the 
impact of financial development on economic growth, investment, and productivity 
(Ghirmay, 2006 etc.). 
Fourth, firm-level TFP studies within a country investigate the enormous degree 
of heterogeneity in productivity across firms/industries within a country.  Inspired by the 
functions of financial systems, several channels are proposed in the literature.  This 
literature is explored in more detail in the following section.   
3.3 Channels through which FD Impacts TFP at the Firm-Level 
3.3.1 Firm-Level Financial Constraints 
Giudici and Paleari (2000), through their survey of small, high-tech Italian firms, 
find that financial constraints are one of the main obstacles to the development of 
innovation.  Gatti and Love (2008) find that access to credit has a positive influence on 
TFP in Bulgaria.  Badia and Slootmaekers (2008) empirically link financial constraints to 
firm level productivity in Estonia.  Using an indirect approach, they find that financial 
constraints considerably curtail productivity in most sectors but using a structural 
approach, financial constraints do not lower productivity for most sectors with the 
exception of R&D/other business activities and construction sectors.  Benfratello et al. 
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(2008) find evidence that in Italy, banking development affects the probability of process 
innovation,
10
 especially for firms in high-tech sectors and in sectors more reliant on 
external finance, and for small firms. 
3.3.2 Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance is a mechanism through which capital and resources are 
allocated, profits are distributed, and the performance of the corporation is monitored.  
Equity holders or creditors are more willing to provide funds to firms with effective 
corporate governance; therefore better corporate governance can promote economic 
growth.  The threat of a corporate takeover in well-functioning stock markets can 
mitigate the principle-agent problem and promote efficient resource allocation and 
growth (Levine and Zervos, 1996).  Corporate governance determines the extent to which 
the suppliers of funds to a firm can monitor the firm and influence the decisions that the 
firm takes in terms of allocation of capital and maximization of the firm’s value.  
Different dimensions of corporate governance are reported in the literature.  This study 
focuses mainly on two of them: the firm’s financial structure and the firm’s ownership 
structure (Mayr, 1996; Maher and Anderson, 1999)
11
. 
3.3.2.1 Firm’s Financial Structure and TFP 
Though financial structure provides a corporate governance mechanism that 
monitors the management at the firm level, the relationship between a firm’s financial 
structure, usually measured by the leverage ratio (total debt divided by total equity or 
total assets), and the firm’s productivity has not been confirmed.  Two opinions are 
proposed in corporate finance theories.         
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 In the same paper, the evidence on product innovation is tenuous. 
11
 Cited in Kim (2005). 
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 On one hand, theories that emphasize bankruptcy costs, control rights, and 
conflicts of interests between equity and debt holders suggest that firms with more 
intangible assets are more likely to rely on equity financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995).  These theories predict that more innovative firms 
have lower leverage.  Since innovative activities such as Research and Development 
(R&D) are positively related to productivity, there is a negative relationship between firm 
productivity and the firm leverage ratio (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aghion and Bolton, 
1992; Hart, 1995).  On the other side, theories based on agency problems have considered 
conflicts of interest between equity holders and managers (agency problems), that is, 
insiders and outsiders (information asymmetry).  Such theories predict a positive 
relationship between productivity and the leverage ratio (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Stulz, 
1990). 
The empirical evidence for the impact of firm financial structure on firm TFP has 
been mixed.  Several country case studies using firm-level data support a negative 
relationship between leverage and total factor productivity.  Bernstein and Nadiri (1993) 
estimate the negative effect of financial structure, proxied by agency cost of debt and the 
signaling benefits of dividends, on productivity growth in US manufacturing companies.  
Pushner (1995) observes a strong negative relationship between leverage and productivity 
in Japan.  More recent works include those by Nucci et al. (2005) and Nunes et al. (2007).  
On the other hand, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1990) show that firms in the UK and 
Italy with a larger proportion of long-term debt in their capital structure have improved 
total factor productivity.  Similar patterns are found in Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1999) 
for Ecuador using both aggregated financial data and micro level data, and in 
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Schiantarelli and Scrivastava (1999) for India.  Nickell and Nicholitasas (1999) find that 
financial pressure (defined as the ratio of interest payments to cash flow) has a positive 
effect on productivity.  Kim (2005), who uses micro-level data in South Korea, finds that 
a high debt ratio is negatively related to productivity in non-chaebol (not family owned) 
but positively related in chaebol (family controlled, debt-dependent, and  
diversified) firms. 
3.3.2.2 Firm’s Ownership Structure and TFP 
 For ownership structure, I focus mainly on ownership concentration and 
ownership category.  Ownership concentration theories point in two directions.  
Concentrated ownership can increase incentives to monitor managers.  At the same time 
concentrated ownership firms also tend to invest in more firm-specific activities 
including R&D activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Lucas, 1988).  However an 
agency problem could arise; that is, the controlling shareholders could engage in 
activities at the cost of minority shareholders’ interests (Claessens et al., 2002).  
Dispersed ownership provides more risk sharing, hence allowing engagement in riskier 
innovative activities. 
There is some empirical evidence of the impact of corporate governance on firm 
performance but not much on firm productivity specifically until Kim (2005) who uses 
micro-level data in South Korea to study the relationship between corporate governance 
and productivity.  Focusing on family ownership and capital structure (financial 
structure), Kim finds that ownership concentration does have a positive relationship with 
firm productivity.  In the empirical literature on the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate performance, some studies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cho,1998) 
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raise the endogeneity issue, that is, whether the investors self select the ownership 
structure to maximize the market value of the corporation.  Chen (2001) argues that this 
Wall Street rule does not apply in China because institutional investors cannot buy or sell 
their shares based on firm performance because institutional shares cannot be freely  
traded on either exchange.   
3.4 FD and TFP in China’s Growth 
 Channels through which financial development can impact economic growth in 
China are explored.  Some scholars employ the VAR approach with quarterly or annual 
aggregate data to either study the role of the stock market in economic growth or 
compare the role of banking and market development in the real economy (Shan 2002, 
2006; Rousseau and Xiao 2007, etc.).  However, studies on the role of financial 
development through the total factor productivity channel are relatively new.  Relying on 
provincial data from 1987 to 2001, Zhang et al. (2007) find a significant and positive 
relationship between financial-deepening and productivity growth.  Tan (2006) finds that 
financial development impacts economic growth mainly through quantity effect (capital 
accumulation) rather than quality effect (total factor productivity) in China.  Using a large 
panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing enterprises for 1999-2005 and robust 
econometric procedures, Demetriades et al. (2008) show that the Chinese banking system 
has been conducive to the growth of both firm value-added and TFP.  The access to bank 
and future value-added and TFP growth is positively correlated.  loans is positively 
correlated with In addition, firms with access to bank loans tend to grow faster in regions 
with greater banking sector development.  The effects of bank loans on firm growth are 
statistically significant in the case of purely privately-owned foreign firms, state-owned 
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firms, and collectively-owned firms.      
 Discussion of the Chinese financial system also extends to the debate between 
formal and informal finance.  Ayyagari et al. (2008), using a database of 2400 Chinese 
firms, find that financing from the formal financial system is correlated with faster firm 
growth, whereas financing from alternative channels is not.  However, Du et al. (2008) 
focus on a hybrid financing pattern through formal and informal sectors and discover that 
financing sources do matter and the impact differs across firms; comparatively, foreign 
finance led to the highest growth rate in the 1998-2005 period.  A few studies of the 
effect of corporate governance on firm performance in China find significant effects of 
ownership structure (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi et al., 2001), but only one of them focuses 
on firm productivity level.        
 This study extends the prior studies on the effects of financial development on 
total factor productivity in China at the firm level.  The principle indicators of firm-level 
financial development are derived from the main functions of the financial system.   
Using Chinese listed firm data from 1999 to 2004, two main channels through which 
financial development can affect total factor productivity at the firm level are explored:  
1. financial constraints and 2. corporate governance (financial structure and ownership 
structure as proxies).  In addition, the firm characteristics that are correlates of TFP in the 
literature are examined.  Firm characteristic variables include the capital intensity ratio 




MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Theoretical Model that Links FD to TFP 
 The theoretical framework that links financial development and total factor 
productivity draws essentially on the recent endogenous growth literature (Romer, 1986; 
Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Pagano, 1993 among others).  The role 
of financial development in economic growth can be explained in a simple model:  
   ,                 [1] 
where  and  are output and capital stock at time t, and A is a constant that measures 
the amount of output produced for each unit of capital.  For simplicity, assume that the 
population is stationary, the economy is closed with no government involvement, and 
only a single product is either consumed or invested.  If it is invested, there will be a 
depreciation rate denoted as  so that 
	  
  1  =∆   .             [2] 
Assume that only a fraction (s) of income is saved and a proportion of savings ( 1   is 
lost in the process of channeling funds from savers to borrowers.  Then, equation (2) 
becomes: 
	          ∆   .          [3] 
From equation [1], the growth rate of Y at time t+1 is 
  
 /-1=∆/.  Using 




    .              [4]  
Equation (4) reveals how financial development can affect growth.  It can raise , the 
proportion of savings channeled to investment; raise A, the social marginal productivity 
of capital (total factor of productivity); and raise s, the private saving rate.   
 We know that at the aggregate level, ample empirical evidence shows the positive 
effects of financial development on total factor productivity.  Will those effects be seen at 
the firm level?  Can the heterogeneity of firm productivity that is observed across firms 
and over time be explained by differences in financial development at the firm level? 
4.2 Data and Main Variable Construction 
4.2.1 Data Source 
 The firm-specific variables come from financial reports of the listed firms at both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China from 1999-2004 retrieved from the 
“China Stock Market & Accounting Research” (CSMAR) database that covers all firms 
listed on the Exchanges.  The database is compiled from annual financial reports 
published by those firms.  The format is in accordance with those of COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP and is widely used by scholars and policy makers worldwide.  In order to check 
the accuracy of the data, the China Center of Economic Research (CCER) database is 
also employed to crosscheck the variables used in this study.  Real gross output, real 
intermediate input, real capital stock, labor input, capital service input, intermediate 
input, cost shares of inputs, and TFP level by an index approach are from the EALC 
Database 2007 of the Japan Center for Economic Research, the Hitotsubashi University 
Center for Economic Institutions, the CENU Center for China and Asian Studies, and the 
Center for Corporate Competitiveness of Seoul National University. The financial 
accounting data that they draw on to estimate the TFP level is also from CSMAR.  
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Export-oriented firms are gathered from the Wind Database by the Finance Street Center 
in Beijing.  Calculations of some of the variables are explained in Appendix A.   
4.2.2 Measurement of the Firm-Level TFP 
 The ability to measure TFP at the firm level using micro data allows us to study 
the sources of firm level TFP and relate firm productivity, which is the key to economic 
growth, to changes in the operating environment.  In the literature, there are three major 
approaches to calculating the firm-level productivity: parametric methods (Stochastic 
Frontier, OLS, GMM, Fixed Effects, Instrumental Variables (IV)); semiparametric 
methods (Olley and Parke, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg, Caves, and 
Frazer, 2007)
12
; and nonparametric methods (Index Number and Data Envelope Analysis 
(DEA)). 
Parametric methods are not flexible in the sense that they explicitly specify the 
underlying production functions, though by doing so the sources of the productivity 
growth can be identified.  Meanwhile, they can also incorporate the features of the market 
and industry structure as well as the technological features that affect the industries’ or  
firms’ productivities.  Using parametric methods, the establishment-level productivity  
studies assume output (usually measured as deflated sales or value added) to be a  
function of the inputs the firm employs and its productivity (Katayama et al., 2005).  The 
measure of TFP is then obtained as the residual in this functional relationship.  If we use 
OLS directly to estimate the production function coefficients, there will be a simultaneity 
problem, because the firm’s input choices are not exogenous.  For example, the number 
of workers hired by a firm and the quantity of materials purchased may depend on 
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 The discussion of the robustness of those methods, pros and cons of those approaches can be found in 
“Robustness of Productivity Estimates” by Johannes Van Biesebroeck (2007). 
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unobserved managerial ability, which is part of TFP known to the firm but not observable 
by the researcher.  In addition, unbalanced panel data itself will result in selection bias.  
These issues have been documented by Marschak and Andrews (1964), and Wedervang 
(1965).  Bernard et al. (2005) find that product choices could also be related to the firm’s 
productivity.  Given the well-known problem of simultaneity and endogeneity among 
inputs and unobserved productivity, using the OLS method is generally not advisable.  
Traditional remedies for the problems of simultaneity and endogeneity are estimators 
such as Fixed Effects, IV, or the GMM system estimator that is widely used with 
dynamic panel data.  However, Fixed Effects estimation requires time-invariant firm 
heterogeneity and severe restriction on firms of not choosing inputs in response to 
productivity shocks.  Standard instrumental variables are input and output prices, but they 
are usually unavailable at the firm level (Ackerberg et al., 2007), so the extended GMM 
estimator (GMM system estimator by Blundell and Bond, 1998) instead uses lagged first-
differences of the variables as instruments in the level equation, but differencing removes 
much of the variation in the explanatory variables and can lead to larger measurement 
errors in inputs (Wooldridge, 2005).
13
   
An alternative remedy is to use the second approach, semiparametric methods.  
Olley and Pakes (abbreviated OP, 1996) are the first to solve both endogeneity and 
selection issues.  They use the firm’s investment decision to proxy for unobserved 
productivity shocks and build exit rules into the model.  However, one of the conditions 
that the OP methodology has to meet is a strictly monotonic relationship between the 
proxy (investment) and output.  In econometric estimation, any negative investment value 
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 Wooldridge (2005) shows that a semi-parametric approach (proxy variable approaches to control for 
unobserved productivity) can be implemented by specifying different instruments for different equations 
and applying GMM. 
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has to be dropped or adjusted to zero.  To solve this issue, Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) 
(2003) use intermediate inputs rather than investment as a proxy.  Both OP and LP have 
collinearity problems so Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2007) introduce a hybrid of the 
OP and the LP methods that fixes the collinearity issues.   
Nonparametric methods, such as Index Number (IN), to measuring productivity 
growth, have the advantage of not requiring direct estimation of underlying technology 
and therefore, do not require econometric specification.  In addition, unless there are big 
measurement errors in data, or firms/industries employ very different production 
technologies, productivity level estimates are among the most robust as well.  Both IN 
and DEA analyses have the flexibility to incorporate specification of technology but do 
not allow for unobservable technology. 
 This paper adopts the Multilateral TFP Index Approach by Good,  
Nadiri, and Sickles (1996) to measure TFP at the firm level.  Multilateral TFP Index  
Numbers (IN) approaches to measuring productivity growth are not reliant on direct  
estimation of underlying technology and therefore, do not require econometric  
specification and estimation of technology.  Like other non-parametric methods, no 
specified form of production function or assumed distribution form of residuals is needed 
by IN approaches, and is better in coping with multi-input and multi-output technologies; 
therefore it fits a transition economy like China (Guillaumont et al., 2006).  The Chinese 
economy, like other transition economies shows characteristics of both market 
imperfections and distortions.  In addition, in a transition economy, large variation in 
production technologies is observed across firms due to different ownership structures, 
degrees of openness, or multiple technologies at different production cycles.  A simple 
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form of the modern Index Number methods uses some measure of TFP as a ratio of 
output to a weighted sum of inputs.  Assuming the CES Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function, the Solow total factor productivity index can be expressed as follows: 
   !"  ,                                                         [5] 
where Xl =labor inputs; Xk=capital inputs, and α represents the cost minimizing 
expenditure share for labor.  Where multiple outputs exist, TFP can also be described as 
the ratio of an index number describing aggregate output levels (yj) divided by an index 
number describing aggregate input levels (xi). 
One of the most popular index numbers, the Tornqvist-Theil quantity index, is 
easier to use in that it can be derived from a translog production function of its 
components.  This input index is  
$%&'  (∑ *'+*,  * -$%&*'  $%&* .,                                                  [6] 
where *'denotes the expenditure share of i at observation j.  &*' denotes the quantity of i 
at observation j.  n is the number of i.  It is important to build a point of reference 
comparison with other observations such as observation k.  The most popular Tornqvist-
Theil Index, the discrete Divisia, can be used in time series applications. 
$%&/  (∑ *+*,  */$%&*  $%&*/.                                          [7] 
Values of the index are “chained” off the first observation so any subsequent observation 
can be compared to the first one with: 
$%&  ∑ $%011/1,( .                                                                                                 [8] 
In the first time period, the input index is typically normalized to be one.   The price 
index or output index can be obtained assuming that the underlying utility function or 
revenue function has a translog form.  Using revenue shares rather than expenditure 
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shares for weights, a TFP index can be calculated as the difference between log output 
and log input indices as follows: 
$%  $%2  $%0 .                                                                                             [9] 
The Divisia “chaining” approach, however, has severe limitations with cross-sectional 
or panel data.  It is hard to chain the index and compare between firms since “adjacent” 
makes little sense across firms.       
 Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) address this issue of cross-sectional 
comparisons.  Their solution is to construct a hypothetical firm whose subcomponent 
expenditure shares are the arithmetic mean of expenditure shares for all firms ( ) and 
whose subcomponent quantities are the geometric means of the subcomponent (  
Individual firm observations (subscripted by f) can be compared to the reference firm 
(denoted by *) using the following index: 
$%&34  (∑ 3*+*,  *-$%&3*  $%&*..                                                                      [10] 
Good, Nadiri, and Sickles (1996) combine both the Divisia “chaining” approach and 
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert’s “hypothetical firm” approach.  They construct a 
hypothetical firm for each cross section and then chain the hypothetical firms over time.  
The resulting input quantity index describes the aggregate input at time t for firm f 













-*1  *,1/.-$%&*1  $%&*1/., 
 [11] 
where &3* is the input level of factor i at firm f in year t.  3* is the cost share of input i at 
firm f in year t.  The upper bar indicates the average value of that variable over all firms in  
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a time period. For example, $%&* shows the natural log of the average quantity of input i 
overall all the firms in time period t.  This productivity index can summarize the 
distribution of firms’ TFP across sections and over time.  So,  a firm f’s measure of TFP 
relative to a hypothetical firm at the base time period can be calculated in the following 
equation: 
$%3  7∑ (8', -93'  9'.-$%3'  $%'.  ∑ ∑

(
8',1, -9'1  9',1/.-$%'1 
$%',1/.:  ;∑ (+*, -3*  *.-$%&3*  $%&*.  ∑ ∑

(
+*,1, *1  *1/-$%&*1 
$%&*1/.],                                                                                                                  [12] 
where 93' denotes the share of revenue of firm f’s output j in time period of t, the upper 
bar indicates the average value of that variable over all firms in that industry in that time 
period,but assuming that each firm produces only one product in that particular 
industry, this index is given by: 
$%3  -$%3  $%.  ∑ -$%1  $%1/.1,  7∑ (+*, -3*  *.-$%&3* 
$%&*.  ∑ ∑ (+*,1, -*1  *1/.-$%&*1  $%&*1/.:,                                         [13]       
where 3is the output level of firm f in year t and &3* is the input level of factor i at 
firm f in year t.  3* is the cost share of input i at firm f in year t, the bar shows the 
average value of that variable over all firms in that industry in that time period. 
 Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables that are used to estimate 
TFP.  Appendix B reports the structure of 33 industries, which are split into two 
samples―manufacturing and non-manufacturing―and their TFP growth rates from 
1999 to 2004. 
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics of 
Data for Estimating the Firm-Level TFP 
(in million RMB) 
Variable        Mean    Std.  Dev.        Min       Max 
rgoutput 1522.867 5953.075 0.043573 287106 
rintermediate 1210.065 6631.857 1.449761 394795 
realcap 1052.057 6249.297 1.3 286230 
labor 7611.203 21428.36 34.36214 993334.6 
tfp -0.03485 0.291415 -5.35469 1.24057 
Notes: 
1.  Variable Definitions: Nominal Gross Output (sales) is based on sales after adjusting for 
increases/decreases in inventories; real output (rgoutput) is deflated using the price index for each industry;  
labor input (labor) is calculated by multiplying the number of employees by the average number of hours 
worked in each industry, the number of employees is from CSMAR database, labor cost is obtained from 
the financial statements; real capital cost (realcap) is the value of capital stock multiplied by capital service; 
rintermediate: real intermediate input.  All in 1999 prices. All the variables are in natural logarithm. 
2.  Data Source: EALC (East Asian Listed Corporations), 2007, retrieved from 
http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/research/database070528.html.  Industry classification is from International 
Comparison of Productivity among Asian Countries (ICPA) Project, and industries are reclassified to be in 
concordance with ISIC stock codes.  The detailed calculation can be obtained from their website. 
 
4.2.3 Measurement of the Firm-Level Financial Development  
 Proxies such as private credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, or 
financial depth measured by M2 deflated by nominal GDP, have been widely used to 
measure financial development at the country level (King and Levine, 1993a, b, c; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998).  To measure firm-level financial development, one first 
considers one of the major functions of the financial system―access to capital 
measured by financial constraints at the firm level.  Second, one considers corporate 
governance as the other channel.  The corporate finance literature suggests that market 
imperfections due to an underdeveloped financial and legal system will raise the cost of 
external finance and therefore hamper a firm’s ability to raise funds for its projects 
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(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  The importance of the financial system for reducing a firm’s 
external financial constraints and affecting firm growth is evaluated and shown in the 
work by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).  How does one measure the financial 
constraints at the firm level?  
In the corporate finance literature, there are several measures of financial 
constraints.  Traditional measures include total assets (size), the dividend payout ratio, 
and bond ratings (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1988; Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach, 2004; Almeida and Campello, 2007; Whited, 1992; Hasset, and Oliner, 
2006).  However, all those measures depend only on a unidementional definition of 
financial constraints, when in reality multiple variables can affect financial constraints.  
The corporate finance literature also suggests that financially constrained firms tend to 
be small or unprofitable, have high growth potential, or have high leverage, and hence 
low debt capacity.  Kaplan and Zingales (KZ hereafter, 1997) are among the first who 
propose classifying firms into five groups according to their financial constraint status 
and then they use an ordered logit regression to relate the classifications to accounting 
variables using the Fazzari et al. (1986) sample.  Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) 
estimate similar models using the original Kaplan and Zingales (1997) sample and using 
the regression coefficients to construct an index called the KZ index which consists of a 
linear combination of five accounting ratios
14
.  However their way of classifying firms 
into different groups according to their financial constraint status does not vary over 
time, so Cleary (1999, 2006) instead uses multiple discriminant analysis to create a 
different financial constraint index (Zfc).  However, both the KZ index and Zfc may 
suffer from endogeneity issues due to the correlation between the predictors and the 
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 The five variables are cash flow/capital; tobin’s Q; debt/capital;  dividends/capital; and cash/capital. 
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discriminating variable that divide the groups.  An alternative index of financial 
constraints has been proposed by Whited and Wu (2006), who use the Euler equation 
approach to create the WW index
15
.  Even though three indices mentioned above are 
widely used in literature, they utilize U.S. data which cannot be generalized in other 
countries.  Hadlock and Pierce (2009) use different data sets or larger datasets and 
generate different coefficients.  In addition, they cast serious doubt on the KZ index and 
point out that both KZ index and the WW index are subject to endogeneity flaws.  They 
introduce a new index based on two variables that have significant intuitive appeal yet 
are more exogenous than most of the alternatives―firm size and age.  Winker (1999), 
using the framework of the Stiglitz and Weiss model with a panel of firm data in 
Germany, shows that age and size (proxied by the number of employees) reduce the risk 
of facing financial limitations.          
 In this study, a new Quadratic Size-Age Index (Lfcsa) inspired by Hadlock and 
Pierce (2009) and Cleary (1999, 2006) is calculated for listed firms in China.  An 
alternative financial constraint index inspired by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary 
(2002, 2006), Whited and Wu (2006), and Musso and Schiavo (2008) is calculated for 
robustness.  Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of variables used to predict both of the 
financial constraint indices.  For the main financial constraint index calculation, there 
are several steps as follows:  
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 The six variables are cashflow, dividend payer dummy, leverage, firm size, industry sales growth, and 
firm sales growth, all deflated by net fixed assets. 
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TABLE 4 Descriptive Statistics of Data for Estimating  









1.  Variable Definitions: size=natural logarithm (total assets); age= log(current year-the year when the firm 
was established); bmr=log(book-to market ratio); cratio =log(current ratio)=log(current assets/current 
liabilities); gincome=log(growth in net income,%∆NI).  2.  All coefficient estimates are maximum 
likelihood estimates from a logit model estimated over annual observations.  3.  All the variables are 
winsorized at 0.5%. 
 First, firms are divided into three mutually exclusive groups according to an a 
priori measure of financial constraints: the dividend payout ratio.  Group A: dividend 
increasing firms; group B: dividend-decreasing firms; group C: no dividend payments or 
no change in dividends.  Only groups A and Bare used for estimation and the same 
coefficients are assigned to the third group when calculating the constraints score.  
Second, logistic analysis estimates the coefficients that best discriminate between group 
A  (not financially constrained=0) and group B (financially constrained= 1).  The author 
chose logistic analysis over discriminant analysis because discriminant analysis requires 
more strict assumptions.  The logistic regression is expressed in terms of an odds ratio, 









Variable         Obs      Mean  Std.  Dev.        Min        Max 
size 6973 21.01508 0.900312 18.97921 23.62545 
size^2 6973 442.4442 38.17367 360.2105 558.162 
age 7904 1.887754 0.626129 0 2.890372 
age^2 7904 3.955604 2.024933 0 8.354249 
bmr 6852 0.320965 0.208473 -0.42764 0.922172 
cratio 6852 1.687155 1.211909 0.198018 7.475777 
gincome 6855 0.238093 0.830364 -0.9714 5.6995 
Lfcsa 6970 -0.38493 0.396447 -1.03382 2.18265 
Lfc 6849 -0.41787 0.3558 -1.52406 0.769978 
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Thus, the logistic regression can be expressed as follows: 
log  <=>?@A@+<=>? +> @A@+)= KL  K&  K(&( F K+&+. [15] 
So, MNOPQR%S%TRS$ TO%UNSR%U  
@"V , [16] 
where Z is the logistic financial constraint score based on firm size and age represented 
by Lfcsa.            
 Table 5 sets out the results from maximum likelihood function for the 
determinants of firm-level financial constraints.  So, the predicted financial constraint 
score measured by size and age are expressed as:  
WQTS  24.4277  1.8912  R\B  0.0387  R\B(  1.9302  SB  0.3874  SB(, [17] 
where size =natural logarithm of total assets, and age=natural logarithm of (current year-
the year of its incorporation).   
 Third, the logistic financial constraint score (Lfcsa) is assigned to all the firms 
calculated from the weighted summation of the significant variables that are good 
predictors for the degree of financial constraints.  Firms with a high logistic score (Lfcsa) 
are categorized as more financially constrained; firms with a low logistic score Lfcsa are 
deemed as financially unconstrained. 
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TABLE 5 The Logistic Procedure 
Panel A Determinants of the Firm-Level Financial Constraint Score Lfcsa 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
                                               Standard          Wald 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept       1        24.4277      6.9137       12.4835        0.0004 
              size               1         -1.8912      0.6427        8.6606         0.0033 
              size^2           1          0.0387      0.0149        6.7592         0.0093 
              age                1         -1.9302      0.3194       36.5177        <.0001 
              age^2            1         0.3874      0.0875        19.6029        <.0001 
 
Panel B Determinants of the Firm-Level Financial Constraint Score Lfc 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                                Standard      Wald 
              Parameter    DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
              Intercept      1    -0.00262      0.0661        0.0016         0.9683 
              bmr              1     -1.6803      0.1549      117.6561        <.0001 
              cratio         1      0.0768      0.0232       11.0091         0.0009 
              gincome        1     -0.0226      0.0105        4.5943          0.0321 
Notes:  
1.  Variable Definitions: size=log(total assets); age= log(current year-the year of its incorporation)
16
; bmr 
=book-to-market ratio; cratio=current ratio=(current assets/current liabilities), a proxy for a firm’s liquidity 
status; gincome= the growth in income.  2. All the variables are winsorized at 0.5%. 
 
 Even though there are potential endogeneity issues, as a robustness check, we use 
all the available predictors that are used in previous approaches by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), Cleary (2002, 2006), Whited and Wu (2006), and Musso and Schiavo (2008).  
Rather than employing their coefficients directly, as do numerous other studies in the 
                                                           
16
 In Hadlock’s paper, their “age” is defined as the current year minus the first year that the firm has a 
nonmissing stock price on Compustat file. For China, since the Chinese Stock Exchanges are relatively 
young , and many of them get listed at the same time, so I use current year minus the date of incorporation , 
like Liu and Hsu (2006). 
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literature, the predictors that best fit China’s data are chosen and logistic regression is 
used.  The variables that are adopted are book-to-market ratio (bmr), current ratio 
(cratio), and income growth (gincome).  The results for the determinants of firm-level 
financial constraints are set out in Table 5 Panel B.  The coefficients are maximum 
likelihood estimates, which are used to construct an alternative financial constraint score 
for Chinese listed firms.  The score (Lfc) can be calculated as follows: 
WQT  0.00262  1.6803  P`N  0.0768  TNSURO  0.0226  R%TO`B, [18] 
where bmr stands for book-to-market ratio; cratio=current ratio, a proxy for a firm’s 
liquidity status; and gincome represents the growth in income.  When a firm has a high 
book-to-market ratio, it is undervalued, and has a big growth potential; the higher the 
potential, the more funds it can raise, and the lower its financial constraint score.  If a 
firm has a higher current ratio (more liquidity), its financial constraint score is higher, one 
explanation is that a firm chooses to hold a high level of cash may be a sign of being 
financially constrained for precautionary reasons (Hadlock and Pierce, 2009).  
Table 6 summarizes the statistics for the predicted firm-level financial constraint 
score using two approaches.  Those two indices provide a good prediction for a firm’s 
financial constraint level, it could predict whether a firm will increase its dividend payout 
ratio (less financially constrained) or decrease its dividend payout ratio (more financially 
constrained) in the future.  Traditional measurements―size and age, which are used to 
predict one of the financial constraint scores―are directly used in the following empirical 
models to study the role of financial constraints in total factor productivity at the firm 
level.  The reasons I chose those two variables are as follows: 1. they are related to both 
financial constraints and TFP and 2. the use of these two variables as exogenous 
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regressors might help reduce the endogeneity problems.    
 Two critical elements that define a firm’s corporate governance are financial 
structure and ownership structure.  The debt-to-asset ratio is used to measure the financial 
structure; and the top one or top ten shareholder percentage is used to measure ownership 
concentration.  State-ownership percentage and tradable share percentage are to proxy for 
ownership category. 
TABLE 6 Descriptive Statistics of 
Firm-Level Financial Constraint (Lfc and Lfcsa) Scores 
 
WQTS  24.4277  1.8912  R\B  0.0387  R\B(  1.9302  SB  0.3874  SB( 




Notes :  
1.  All coefficient estimates are maximum likelihood estimates from a logit model estimated over 
annual observations.  2.  Variable Definitions: size=log(total assets); age= log(current year-the 
year of its incorporation). ; bmr =book-to-market ratio; cratio=current ratio=(current assets/current 
liabilities), a proxy for a firm’s liquidity status; gincome= the growth in income; Lfcsa and Lfc are 
two financial constraint scores.  3.  All the variables are winsorized at 0.5%. 
4.3 Empirical Models 
4.3.1 The Pooled OLS Model 
To evaluate the role of financial development in firm productivity growth, I first estimate 
a firm’s total factor productivity level, then regress it on variables that proxy for firm-
level TFP.  The empirical model is specified as follows: 
$%*  aL  KLbc*  Kdefg*  K(b&*  Khbi0Mjk`  KlbfMB%jk`   m*, 
R  1, … , %; U  1,….   [19] 
where: 
pqrstuv=the log of the TFP level of firm i at time t. 
swuv=the financial constraint level of firm i in year t measured by size and age. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Lfcsa 6970 -0.38493 0.396447 -1.03382 2.18265 
Lfc 6849 -0.41787 0.3558 -1.52406 0.769978 
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xyzuv=a vector of variables that are proxies for corporate governance level: leverage 
(debt) ratio (financial structure, measured by debt- to-assets ratio), firm ownership 
concentration (percentage of ownership by top one and ten shareholder); and firm 
ownership category (state ownership and tradable share ownership percentage). 
{uv=a vector of firm-specific variables: firm’s capital insensitivity (kl: ratio of capital to 
labor input) which is believed to be correlated with firm TFP level.   
Dummy variables=the export orientation, which refers to a firm’s international exposure 
to foreign markets (major exporters vs.  non-major exporters, if 50% of the sales are in 
overseas markets, the firm is considered a major exporter.); industry (manufacturing vs.  
non-manufacturing); and 2002 year dummy to control for the effects of financial 
liberalization (openness).  The variables are believed to be related to a firm’s 
productivity growth.  Static models (without the lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor) using the pooled OLS regressions with various specifications are estimated 
and the results provide an initial analysis of the determinants of firm level TFP. Year 
dummies (|*are included to control for common trends or business cycle effects. 
4.3.2 The Fixed Effects Model  
 A Pooled OLS estimator would be a consistent and efficient estimator if  
(individual effects) were the same across all the firms in the study.  However, some firm 
effects that need to be addressed.  Since there is some time-invariant heterogeneity due 
to unobserved firm characteristics such as managerial efficiency, Fixed Effects models 
are proposed.  Both Breusch-Pagan (BP, an LM test) and Hausman tests are conducted 
for random and fixed effects respectively to confirm the soundness of the empirical 
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specifications.  c}R( is 225.73 with P-value>c}R( at 0.0000(significant) also shows that 
a Fixed Effects model can provide better estimates. 
$%*  aL  KLbc*  Kdefg*  K(b&*    m*, 
R  1, … , %; U  1,… .   [20] 
where : 
 pqrstuv=the log of the TFP level of firm i at time t.      
swuv=the financial constraint level of firm i in year t measured by size and age. 
xyzuv=a vector of variables that are proxies for corporate governance level: leverage 
(debt) ratio (financial structure, measured by debt- to-assets ratio), firm ownership 
concentration (percentage of ownership by top one and ten shareholder); and firm 
ownership category (state ownership and tradable share ownership percentage).  
{uv=a vector of firm specific variables: the firm’s capital insensitivity (ratio of capital to 
labor input) which is believed to be correlated with firm TFP level. , and  , are firm 
and year dummies,  represents error term.        
 Two main econometric issues are involved in the estimations.  First, endogeneity 
arises from reverse causality for several TFP correlates. It could be due to the correlation 
between the observed firm characteristics and unobserved firm heterogeneity.  For 
example, if exporters are found to be more productive, it could be the case that more 
productive firms are more competitive in export markets.  Or for leverage ratio (measured 
by the debt-to-asset ratio), firms with a certain leverage ratio are bound to a given level of 
intangibles, which are translated into higher TFP, while a firm wishing to innovate by 
increasing its share of intangible assets is bound to change its leverage or simply, firms 
with a higher TFP are likely to generate higher profits and therefore borrow less (lower 
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debt-to-asset ratio).  Causality may run in both directions for financial constraints.  
Reverse causality from TFP to ownership structures is less likely due to the special 
characteristics of listed firms’ ownership structures mentioned earlier.  In theory, this 
problem could be solved by either using instrumental variables (IV) that are correlated 
with TFP correlates yet not with TFP, Fixed Effects models, or Fixed Effects models with 
IVs.  In practice, such variables are hard to find.  In the literature, some instrumental 
variables for the leverage are proposed (Nucci et al., 2004).  They are tax policies that are 
included in the calculation of the user cost of capital.  The heterogeneity across firms in 
their tax status makes tax policies potential instruments.  Nucci et al. (2004) argue that 
the tax policies are likely to influence a firm’s financial structure, since they can cause 
variation in the cost of financing, yet taxes are not necessarily driven by other factors that 
might influence the productivity level.  My approach to address other endogeneity 
problems is to include control variables in the Fixed Effects models because of not 
enough data for some potential instrumental variables that are proposed in the literature.  
Since Fixed Effects-IV estimation would be more appropriate, the results from the 
current study need to be interpreted with caution.   
Second, given the large number of possible correlates of TFP, the regression 
might have multicollinearity problems.  The correlation matrix shows that the correlation 
among most of the independent variables is low except for the top one and top ten 
shareholder ownership variables.  To address the potential problem, I estimate 
regressions, including them one at a time along with basic control variables.  Though by 
doing so, the model specifications might suffer from an omitted variables’ problem, if the 
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effects are similar to those that are estimated from the regressions that include all of the 
correlates, the results could be more reliable.   
In the next chapter, several hypotheses are tested to determine the effects of firm-
level financial development through two proposed channels: 1. a firm’s financial 
constraints measured by firm size and age; 2. a firm’s corporate governance level.  The 
role of firm characteristics that are correlates of TFP in the literature are examined too.  
The variables include the capital intensity ratio (kl), the export and openness dummies.  
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables that will be used in the empirical 
models.  Table 8 summarizes the hypotheses.    
TABLE 7 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Empirical Models 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tfp -0.03299 0.249997 -1.0485 0.496249 
sshare 0.331305 0.265009 0 0.765958 
oneshareholder 0.385062 0.21771 0 0.8 
tenshareholder 0.543506 0.235671 0 0.919315 
tshare 0.384731 0.116876 0.145318 0.724302 
dtar 0.487281 0.239943 0.083705 1.81658 
kl 0.309109 2.673326 0.003284 90.43124 
size 21.02284 0.9697678 15.75939 27.12479 
age 1.88838 0.6271937 0 3.135494 
Notes:  
 
1. Variable Definitions:tfp=log(TFP);sshare=log(state share/total 
share);oneshareholder=log(shares held by the top one shareholder/total shares); 
tenshareholder=log(shares held by the top ten shareholders/total shares); dtar=log(debt to total 
asset ratio); kl=log(real capital/real labor); tshare=log(tradable shares/total shares); size=log (total 
assets); age= log (current year-the year of its incorporation).  
2. All of the variables are in natural logarithm. 






TABLE 8 Summary of Hypotheses 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Financial Development at the firm-level 
Channel 1: Access to capital 
Hypothesis 1: The more easily the firm accesses capital, the higher TFP of a firm. 
 ( higher firm-level financial development is positively associated with firm-level TFP) 
Channel 2: Corporate Governance 
Financial Structure (leverage or debt ratio) 
Hypothesis 2: Debt-to-Asset Ratio is either positively or negatively associated with firm-
level TFP 
Ownership Structure 
      Ownership concentration (top one or top ten shareholder ownership percentage) 
Hypothesis 3: Ownership concentration is positively associated with the firm-level TFP.  
      Ownership Category 
Hypothesis 4: State-ownership has a negative relationship with firm-level TFP. 
Share Type 
Hypothesis 5: Tradable-share ownership has a positive relationship with firm-level TFP. 
Firm Characteristics ( other correlates of TFP and control variables) 
Capital Intensity (capital-to-labor intensity ratio) 
Hypothesis 7: Firms with higher capital-to-labor intensity ratios have higher TFP levels. 
Other Control Variables 
Industry Dummy ( Manufacturing =1,Non-manufacturing=0) 
Export Orientation Dummy (Export=1; Non-Export=0) 
Openness Dummy (The year 2002-2004 to control for financial liberalization) 
Hypothesis 8: Firms with more export orientation, after 2002 or in manufacturing 
industries, are more productive than those otherwise. 





5.1 Pooled OLS Models 
Empirical results are reported in this section.  Table 9 summarizes the results from 
Equation [19] using pooled OLS regressions.  The financial constraint measures−size and 
age−are used in all the specifications.  In the literature, bigger and older firms are found 
to have easier access to the capital (Winker, 1999), so firm size and TFP or firm age and 
TFP is expected to be positively related.  However, since younger firms tend to be more 
innovative than older firms, the sign of the age variable could be mixed.  The coefficients 
estimated from all the specifications in Table 9 (Panel A and B) show that financial 
development is positively associated with TFP at the firm-level.  Financial structure, 
measured by debt-to-asset ratio, is negatively associated with firm TFP level.  Firms with 
lower leverage are on average more productive.  The estimated coefficient is -0.11.  All 
of the coefficients are significant at 1% level.  In China’s case, the findings support the 
hypothesis that financial structure is negatively related with TFP, which is consistent with 
the findings in the literature based on two groups of theories (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995).  In addition, if a firm 
is more capital intensive, its productivity level is higher (kl is significant at 1% 
significance level).  In Table 9 Panel A, ownership concentration proxied by top one 
shareholder ownership is positively related with a firm’s productivity level.  However, 
top ten shareholder ownership’s association with the firm-level TFP is insignificant.  
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      TABLE 9  Pooled OLS Models from Equation [19] 
Panel A.  Estimates using Financial Constraints,  
Financial Structure, and Ownership Concentration 
 




1. Variable Definitions: tfp=log(TFP); sshare= log(state share/total share); exportdum=1  if the companies’ 
overseas sales >50% of their total sales, 0 otherwise; manufac=1 if they belong to manufacturing industries, 
0 otherwise; opendum=1 if firm-year observations are from year 2002-2004,  0 if they are from years 1999-
2001; dtar=log(debt to total asset ratio); size=log(total assets); age= log(current year-the year of its 
incorporation); kl=log(real capital/real labor); oneshareholder=log(shares held by the top one 
shareholder/total shares); tenshareholder=log(shares held by the top ten shareholders/total shares) 
2.  All of the variables are in natural logarithm.   
3.  All the variables are winsorized at 0.5%.   





















        
size 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
age -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
dtar -0.11***   -0.11*** -0.11***   
 (0.007)   (0.008) (0.008)   
oneshareholder  0.01*  0.01    
  (0.008)  (0.007)    
tenshareholder   0.02  0.01   
   (0.012)  (0.012)   
kl      0.01*** 0.01*** 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
exportdum      0.07*** 0.07*** 
      (0.024) (0.024) 
manufac      0.02*** 0.02*** 
      (0.007) (0.007) 
opendum       0.03*** 
       (0.007) 
constant -1.24*** -0.89*** -0.90*** -1.20*** -1.21*** -0.86*** -0.93*** 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.091) 
        
Observations 4940 4154 4154 4146 4146 5147 5147 
R-squared 0.097 0.060 0.059 0.104 0.104 0.063 0.060 
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Panel B.  Estimates using Financial Constraints,  
Financial Structure, and Ownership Category 
 
Dependent Variable: ln (TFP) 















        
size 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
age -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.08*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
sshare  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01** -0.01** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) 
tshare   0.00  0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
   (0.012)  (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
exportdum      0.08*** 0.08*** 
      (0.027) (0.027) 
manufac      0.02* 0.02** 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
dtar -0.11***   -0.12*** -0.11***   
 (0.007)   (0.008) (0.007)   
kl       0.01*** 
       (0.004) 
opendum       0.03*** 
       (0.008) 
constant -1.24*** -0.99*** -0.97*** -1.31*** -1.23*** -1.02*** -0.96*** 
 (0.088) (0.099) (0.089) (0.100) (0.090) (0.102) (0.108) 
        
Observations 4940 3868 5147 3718 4940 3868 3868 
R-squared 0.097 0.067 0.058 0.116 0.097 0.069 0.068 
Notes:  
 
1.  Variable Definitions: tfp=log(TFP); sshare=log(state share/total share); exportdum=1 if the companies’ 
overseas sales >50% of their total sales, 0 otherwise; manufac=1 if they belong to manufacturing industries, 
0 otherwise; opendum=1 if firm-year observations are from years 2002-2004, 0 if they are from year 1999-
2001; dtar=log(debt to total asset ratio); size=log(total assets); age= log(current year-the year of its 
incorporation ); kl=log(real capital/real labor); sshare=log(state share/total share); tshare=log(tradable 
shares/total shares). 
2.  All of the variables are in natural logarithm.  
3.  All the variables are winsorized at 0.5%. 
4.  Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In Table 9 Panel B, firms with higher state ownership percentage tend to be less 
productive than those with less state-share ownership, which is in line with the results 
from the literature.  However, tradable-share ownership does not appear to be significant.  
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The reason could be that firms with more tradable shares have, on one hand, more access 
to capital through the stock market but on the other hand, suffer more from the bear 
market than those with fewer tradable shares. 
 Table 9 also shows the effects of the industry dummy, export dummy, and 
openness dummy.  It is found that manufacturing industries have higher TFP levels at a 
1% significance level.  The export dummy controls the effects of a firm’s international 
orientation.  The results show that exporters more productive than non-exporters, which 
is consistent with findings in Fernandes (2009) using data from manufacturing firms in 
Bangladesh.  The years 2001-2002 witnessed significant changes: China’s accession to 
the WTO; introduction of programs opening up the financial market more to investors at 
home and abroad; and more liberalization in the banking sector.  Results show that the 
TFP level from 2002-2004 is higher than that from 1999 to 2001 on average.  This 
finding is in line with the findings by Bekaert et al. (2009) using cross-country data.  
Year dummies are included to control for the possible trend effects.  
5.2 Fixed Effects Models 
Table 10 shows the relationship between financial development and productivity 
at the firm level using the specifications in equation [20].  Regressions are estimated 
using Fixed Effects Panel Regression Models.  By including firm fixed effects, I can also 
control for any other unobserved firm characteristics that can affect the relationship 
between the firm-level TFP and the independent variables.  Year dummies are added to 
control for the temporal effects of financial development on productivity at the firm level.  
Financial constraint proxies are included in all the specifications.  Table 10 Panel A 
column (1) shows the results using the base model, where size and age are examined.  
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Results show that firm size and age are entered with the expected signs at 1% level of 
significance.  
  TABLE 10  Fixed Effects Regressions from Equation [20] 
Panel A  Estimates: Financial Constraints,  
Financial Structure, and Ownership Concentration 
 
Dependent Variable: ln (TFP) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
        
size 0.07***  0.11*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.010)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
age -0.14***  -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (0.026)  (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
dtar  -0.12*** -0.15***   -0.15*** -0.15*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)   (0.012) (0.012) 
oneshareholder    0.01  0.01  
    (0.009)  (0.009)  
tenshareholder     0.03**  0.04*** 
     (0.013)  (0.013) 
constant -1.28*** -0.11*** -2.07*** -0.90*** -0.91*** -1.77*** -1.79*** 
 (0.224) (0.010) (0.231) (0.242) (0.241) (0.248) (0.248) 
        
Observations 5147 4942 4940 4154 4154 4146 4146 
R-squared 0.023 0.038 0.066 0.025 0.026 0.068 0.070 
Number of company 1165 1165 1165 1160 1160 1160 1160 
Notes: 
 
1.  Variable Definitions: tfp=log (TFP); sshare= log (state share/total share); dtar=log (debt to total asset 
ratio); oneshareholder=log(shares held by the top one shareholder/total shares); tenshareholder=log(shares 
held by the top ten shareholders/total shares). 
2.  All of the variables in natural logarithm. 
3.  All the variables are winsorized at 0.5%. 







Panel B  Estimates: Ownership Category,  
Financial Structure, Financial Constraints, and TFP 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
        
size 0.07***  0.11*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.010)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
age -0.14***  -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
 (0.026)  (0.025) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) 
dtar  -0.12*** -0.15***   -0.16*** -0.16*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)   (0.013) (0.011) 
sshare    -0.02*  -0.02  
    (0.014)  (0.013)  
tshare     -0.16***  -0.20*** 
     (0.027)  (0.027) 
constant -1.28*** -0.11*** -2.07*** -1.49*** -1.64*** -2.34*** -2.60*** 
 (0.224) (0.010) (0.231) (0.264) (0.231) (0.272) (0.240) 
        
Observations 5147 4942 4940 3868 5147 3718 4940 
R-squared 0.023 0.038 0.066 0.027 0.032 0.075 0.080 
Number of  
company 
1165 1165 1165 915 1165 915 1165 
Notes:  
 
1. Variable Definitions: tfp=log(TFP); dtar=log(debt to total asset ratio); size=log(total assets); age= 
log(current year-the year of its incorporation ); sshare=log(state share/total share); tshare=log(tradable 
shares/total shares). 
2.  All of the variables are in natural logarithm. 
3.  All the variables are winsorized at 0.5%. 
4.  Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
model.  In column (2), financial structure proxied by the debt-to-asset ratio (dtar) is 
included in the model.  When a firm’s debt ratio is 10 percent higher than other firms, its 
total factor productivity level is 1.2% lower than others, which is consistent with the 
findings in literature based on one group of theories.   
While a firm’s financial structure is one indicator of financial development, it is 
crucial to define a firm’s corporate governance, as mentioned earlier.  An effective 
corporate governance also reflects one aspect of the financial system.  Besides the 
financial structure, other variables that could proxy for a firm’s corporate governance are 
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financial ownership concentration and ownership category.  Because of the special 
characteristics of Chinese listed firms, state share percentage, tradable A share 
percentage, and top one and top ten shareholder percentage are used to gauge the 
ownership structure.  Column (3) in Panel A of Table 10 presents the results of the 
impact on TFP at the firm level of financial constraints and financial structure while 
columns (4)-(6) show the impact of financial constraints, financial structure, and 
corporate governance proxied by ownership concentration percentage on TFP at the firm 
level respectively and jointly.  The results are still significant.  The effects of leverage 
(debt-to-asset) ratio, firm size and age are consistent with those seen in the base model.  
However, the effects of ownership concentration between top one and top ten shareholder 
ownership percentages are mixed.  Top one shareholder concentration has an 
insignificant relationship with firm-level TFP but top ten shareholder concentration has a 
significant positive relationship.  If ownership is too concentrated, firms might tend to 
lose efficiency but if ownership is sufficiently concentrated, owners can monitor 
corporate governance more effectively, which is more beneficial for the productivity 
level.   
In Table 10 Panel B, ownership category (state-share and tradable-share 
percentage) are used to proxy for corporate governance.  Financial constraints are 
measured by size and age.  The results on financial constraints proxies are similar to 
those in Panel B.  Corporate governance measured by state-share ownership has no 
significant impact on TFP level consistently across different econometric specifications, 
while corporate governance measured by tradable-share ownership has a significant 
negative relationship with productivity level.  That means firms with more tradable 
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shares are more prone to the ups and downs of the stock market.  From 1999 to 2004, the 
Chinese stock market experienced a long bear market, which affected the firms with more 
tradable-shares in a negative way.  The results for the main hypotheses are listed in Table 
11. 
TABLE 11  Summary of Results 
Hypotheses  Full Sample 
 
Financial Development at the 
firm-level 
 
Channel 1: Access to capital  
Hypothesis 1: The more easily the 
firm accesses capital, the higher 
TFP of a firm. 
 Supported 
Channel 2: Corporate 
Governance 
 
Financial Structure (Debt ratio)  
Hypothesis 2: Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
is either positively or negatively 
associated with firm-level TFP. 
Supported (negative relationship) 
Ownership Structure  
   Ownership concentration (top one 
or top ten shareholder ownership 
percentage) 
 
Hypothesis 3: The more 
concentrated the shareholder 
ownership, the higher TFP level. 
Supported 
    Ownership Category (ownership 
type and share type) 
 
Hypothesis 4 State-ownership has a 
negative relationship with the firm-
level TFP.. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5: Tradable-share 
ownership has a positive 
relationship with the firm-level TFP. 
Not Supported 









TABLE 11  (cont’d) 
Hypotheses  Full Sample 
 
Firm Characteristics ( other 
correlates of TFP and control 
variables) 
 
Capital Intensity (kl)  
Hypothesis 7: Firms with higher 
capital to labor intensity ratio have 
higher TFP level. 
Supported 
Other Control Variables  
Industry Dummy ( Manufacturing 
=1,Non-manufacturing=0) 
 
Export Orientation Dummy 
(Export=1; Non-Export=0) 
 
Openness Dummy ( Year 2002 to 
control for financial liberalization) 
 
Hypothesis 8: Firms with more 
export orientation, after the year 
2002, or in manufacturing industries 
are more productive than those 
otherwise. 
Supported 
Note: Hypotheses 1-8 are all alternative hypotheses. 
 
5.3 Robustness Check: Sample Split 
 For a robustness check of whether the role of financial development differs across 
different types of firms, I split the sample into two subsamples according to industry, 
state-ownership, and tradable-share type.  In Table 12 Panel A, we compare the effects of 
financial constraints and financial structure on TFP level in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries.  Size (a measure of financial constraints) has different degree 
of association with the firm-level TFP for manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries.  The Chow test shows that the two coefficients of size between those two 
subsamples are different at 1% significance level.  
 Considering the special characteristics of Chinese listed firms, we find that 
ownership category matters for the financial constraints.  Chow et al. (2002) find that 
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firms with more state shares usually have an advantage of a soft budget (preferential 
subsidy from the government, for example).  Therefore, Table 12 Panel B compares the 
results between firms where more than 33% of the shares are state owned and firms 
where fewer than 33% of the shares are non-state-owned.  Interestingly, we find that the 
relationship between age and firm-level TFP differs between those two subsamples (with 
the threshold being 33% of state-share ownership, the mean value of the total sample).  
Financial development matters more for firms with less than 33% state share ownership.  
While the state-owned enterprises are more prone to managerial inefficiency, the older 
the firms are, the lower their productivity level.  The Chow test shows that the coefficient 
of age is different across those two subsamples at 10% level of significance.  
 In addition, also because of the special characteristics of share type of listed firms 
in China, how many shares are tradable among investors could show the extent to which 
the firms are open to the stock market.  Between 2001 and 2005, the period when China 
was searching for the Big Fix, the biggest movement was to reduce the state’s holding of 
non-tradable shares.  So splitting the whole sample into two subsamples based on 
tradable shares is a way to examine the impact of financial development on TFP level.  
Table 12 Panel C shows that the TFP level of firms with more tradable shares is more 
responsive to financial constraints than that of firms with those with fewer tradable 
shares.  That is expected according to the hypothesis that financial development affects a 
firm’s TFP level more during stock market expansion.  The Chow test shows that the 
coefficients of financial structure are different between firms with more tradable shares 
and those with fewer tradable shares, while the coefficients of size and age are about the 
same.  That means the stock market is still relatively small compared to financial 
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intermediaries. The study finds evidence that financial development is associated with 
firm-level TFP through two of the channels that are embodied in the functions of a sound 
financial system―to ease access to financing and to improve corporate governance.  The 
effects of those two proposed channels could differ across industries (manufacturing 
versus non-manufacturing), ownership type (>33% of shares being state-owned vs. <33% 
of shares being state-owned), and share type (firms with more than 38% of their shares 
that are tradable vs. those with fewer than 38% of shares that are tradable). 
 
TABLE 12  Fixed Effects Models: Sample Split 
 
Dependent Variable: ln (TFP) 
   Panel A  Panel B              Panel C  
VARIABLES Manufac  Non-Manufac State Share Non State-Share Tshare  Non-Tshare 
size 0.04** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 size_M=size_NonM size_S=size_NonS size_T=size_NonT 
 F(1,4922)=1.49 F(1,3758)=0.11 F(1,3758)=1.59 
 P>F=0.2226 P>F=0.7430  P>F=0.2080 
age -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.12*** 
 (0.044) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.041) 
 age_M=age_NonM age_S=age_NonS age_T=age_NonT 
 F(1,4922)=2.41 F(1,3758)=3.38 F(1,3758)=0.19 
 P>F=0.1203 P>F=0.0659 P>F=0.6631 
dtar -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
         dtar_M=dtar_NonM dtar_S=dtar_NonS dtar_T=dtar_NonT 
 F(1,4922)=10.63 F(1,3758)=1.01 F(1,3758)=3.60 
 P>F=0.0011 P>F=0.3138 P>F=0.4228 
Observations 4940 4940 4940 4940 4940 4940 
Number of 
company 
1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.070 0.070 0.077 0.077 
Notes: 1. Variable definition: size=log (total assets); age=log(current year-the year of the incorporation); 
dtar=log(debt/asset).  2. All variables are in natural logathrim. 3. Chow tests are conducted to check the 





6.1 Summary of Results and Policy Implications  
This study explores the relationship between financial development and total 
factor productivity level, using firm-level data from listed firms in China over the period 
of 1999-2004.  The results show that financial development is positively associated with 
total factor productivity at the firm level in the case of China.  Different from previous 
studies that use country-level financial development, this study focuses mainly on two of 
the major functions of financial system−to ease financial constraints and improve 
corporate governance−as proxies for firm level financial development.  Following the 
common approach in the literature, the calculations of a Chinese listed firm’s financial 
constraint index to predict whether firms are financially constrained or not were based on 
firm size and age (Lfcsa) for each year. Other measures included the logistic discriminant 
score (Lfc) for a robustness check.  Firm size and age are entered directly in the 
regressions as measures for firm-level financial constraints.  The firm-level TFP 
calculated using a non-parametric method (Multilateral TFP Index Approach) was 
retrieved from East Asian Listed Companies (EALC) Database 2007 of the Japan Center 
for Economic Research.   
Regression estimates show that financial development measured by financial 
constraints at the firm level is positively associated with TFP: i.e., the easier the access to 
capital, the higher a firm’s TFP.  
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In addition to the channel of financial constraints, the channel of corporate 
governance on firm-level TFP is also examined.  The results show that a high debt-to 
asset ratio is associated with a lower firm productivity level, which is consistent with one 
line of literature.  Our findings are consistent with the findings that concentration of 
ownership is good for monitoring daily activities and innovative investment.  Ceteris 
paribus, the higher the percentage of top one shareholder ownership, the more productive 
the firm; however, the impact of the percentage of top one shareholder ownership is not 
significant in the Fixed Effects models.  In addition, I also find that firms with high 
capital intensity tend to have a higher TFP level.  The study investigates other correlates 
of TFP and finds that exporters, those firms whose overseas sales are more than 50% of 
their total sales, are more productive than non-exporters.  To control for the effects of the 
opening of China’s financial sector both in the stock market and banking sector, a year 
2002 dummy is added to our specification and the results show that after 2002 firms are 
more productive.  In addition, the impact of financial constraints on firm-level TFP varies 
across manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries; firms with different state share 
ownership; and firms with different tradable share ownership.  The magnitude of the 
impact of financial constraints is greater in manufacturing industries.   In addition, 
financial constraints caused by financial frictions affect the firms disproportionally with 
different state share and tradable share ownership structure financial development matters 
more for firms with less than 33% state share ownership.  Moreover, due to the special 
characteristics of share type of listed firms in China, the number of  shares that are really 
tradable among investors could show the extent to which the firms are open to the stock 
market.   
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In the literature, there is a finance-growth puzzle in China.  Reform in the formal 
financial system cannot catch up with China’s rapid economic growth.  Some argue that 
it is the hybrid system that sustains the growth (Allen et al., 2005).  While it is true that 
the informal financial sector like private firms, township-village enterprises does play a 
vital role in China’s economic growth, we find that China is not a counter example, but a 
perfect example for explaining the positive relationship between finance and economic 
growth.  There is a Chinese saying: regardless the color of the cat, if it can catch a mouse, 
it is a good cat.  What this study considers is the overall financial system and its function 
to provide access to capital.  In fact, a recent paper by Demetriades et al. (2008) shows 
that access to bank loans is positively related with a firm’s future value-added growth, 
and productivity growth and firms with access to bank loans tend to grow faster in 
regions with greater banking sector development.   
 The findings from the current study can provide valuable policy implications for 
the Chinese government for future financial sector reforms especially those in stock 
markets.  Though listed firms account for only a small proportion of GDP, the results 
point to a future direction for the firms.  More and more firms will get listed to raise more 
capital.  More tradable shares will be open to retailer investors.  During the period 2001-
2005, China was searching for the Big Fix and began reducing the state’s holding of non-
tradable shares.  Though that led to a big drop in the stock market and a bear market in 
the following years, the pain needs to be endured before it gets better.  Our results show 
that firms respond more to financial constraints during a more open stock market.  The 
government has already talked about relaxing more restrictions and permitting more good 
firms to be listed.  The positive relationship between financial development and total 
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factor productivity at the firm level implies that the sound financial system that China is 
trying to build will eventually put the country on the path to more sustained economic 
growth.  In addition, the indices that are created using Chinese listed firms can provide a 
way for the government to predict which firms will be more or less financially 
constrained, and that information will help decision makers determine who needs more 
funds and who does not.  
6.2 Future Research 
Future studies could explore the dynamics of TFP across firms within an industry and 
across industries during the sample period.  The Multilateral Index Approach by Good et al.  
(1996) can be decomposed into two parts: (1) the unweighted average firm TFP (within-
firm) and (2) a term measuring the covariance between firm market share and firm TFP 
(between-firm).  The between-firm component measures the allocative efficiency.  If it is 
positive, that means the more productive firms in the industry have higher market shares 
and the allocation of resources is efficient.  The Multilateral Index Approach by Good et 
al. (1996) can also be decomposed into two components: (1) change in TFP between 
firms over time and (2) change in TFP for the typical firm.
17
  Hence, the relative 
importance of allocative efficiency within an industry and TFP growth of an industry can 
be evaluated.   In addition we can examine the impact of financial development on those 
two components and see which one plays the more important role; the results could 
provide more important policy implications.  Fixed Effects-IV approach or GMM 
dynamic panel approach will be used to correct the endogeneity issues.  The possible IVs 
could be tax policy for example and with more data available, we can have better 
estimators and see the direction of causality between financial development and total 
                                                           
17
 A typical firm is defined in Good et al. (1996).  
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List of Data variables: 
1. Real Gross Output (sales): Nominal output is based on sales after adjusting for 
increases/decreases in inventories.  For wholesalers and retailers, instead of sales, the 
difference between sales and purchases was used as output. Real output and real 
intermediate inputs are obtained by deflating nominal value using the price index for each 
industry.  Real values are from the EALC 2007 database. 
2. Labor input: multiplication of number of employees and the average number of hours 
worked in each industry. Number of employees is from CSMAR database; labor cost is 
obtained from the financial statements.  Labor input is from the EALC 2007 database. 
3. Capital cost: capital stock times capital service price which can be obtained from the 
EALC 2007 database. 
4. Firm size: natural logarithm of total assets. Other measures are natural logarithm of 
total employee number, natural logarithm of total market capitalization. 
5. Age: current year minus the year when the firm was incorporated. 
6. Dividend Ratio: (Dividends from Common stock +preferred stock)/Net Income 
7.Current Ratio: Current Asset over Current Liabilities. 
8. Cash: Cash plus Cash Equivalent 
9. Leverage: Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
10. Cashflow: Net cash flows from operations. 
11. State shares are those held by the central government, local governments, or solely 
government-owned enterprises. State shares are not allowed for trading but transferrable 
to domestic institutions, upon approval of CSRC.  Legal person shares are those sold to 
institutional holders such as securities companies and other SOEs during the corporation 




List of Industries 
 


















 Industry Name 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999–2004 
6 Food and kindred 
products 
0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.05 
7 Textile mill 
products 
0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
8 Apparel 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04 
9 Lumber and wood        
10 Furniture and 
fixtures 
0.00 0.13 0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.07 -0.01 




0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 
13 Chemicals 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07 
14 Petroleum and 
coal  
0.00 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.11 0.03 
15 Leather 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -.0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
16 Stone, clay, glass 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.14 
17 Primary metal 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.05 
18 Fabricated  metal 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.09 0.30 0.21 
19 Machinery, non-
elect 
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.08 
20 Electrical 
machinery 
0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.08 




0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.09 
23 Instruments 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.12 
24 Rubber and misc 
plastics 
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 
25 Misc. 
manufacturing 
0.08 0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
Manufacturing Industries 0.0325 0.0611 0.0474 0.0544 0.0626 0.0936 0.0574 
Number of firms 424 481 572 621 668 707  
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Non-Manufacturing Industries and their TFP growth rates, 1999-2004 
 
 Industry Name 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004 
1 Agriculture 0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 
2 Coal mining 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.18 -0.20 -0.32 -0.12 
3 Metal and non-
metallic mining 
0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.23 -0.19 -0.12 -0.12 
4 Oil and gas 
extraction 
0.05 -0.20 -0.31 -0.57 -0.21 -0.78 -0.34 
5 Construction 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 
26 Transportation 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.16 
27 Communication 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.29 0.13 
28 Electric utilities 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
29 Gas utilities 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.06 




and Real Estate 
0.07 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.11 
32 
 
Other private service 0.06 0.22 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.13 
33 Public service        
Non-manufacturing 
Industries 
0.0392 0.035 0.0092  -
0.037 
0.0125 -0.02 0.0042 
Number of firms  236 265 297 319 332 335  
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total factor productivity (TFP) and financial development at the firm-level using 
listed firms in China over the period of 1999 to 2004.  Two main channels 
through which financial development can affect total factor productivity at the 
firm level are explored: 1. financial constraints and 2. corporate governance.  A 
nonparametric approach by Good et al. (1996) is chosen to estimate the firm-level 
TFP.  Traditional measures such as size and age are used as proxies for the first 
channel−financial constraints.  Inspired by Hadlock and Pierce (2009), size and 
age are also chosen as predictor variables to calculate a financial constraint score.  
For the second channel, two dimensions of the corporate governance are 
examined: financial structure measured by the debt-to-asset ratio and ownership 
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also evaluates the relationship between a firm’s characteristics (capital intensity 
and export orientation) and its TFP level.  Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects 
estimators are used and the Chow tests are conducted to see whether the role of 
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Findings and Conclusions: This study finds that financial development measured by 
financial constraints at the firm level is positively associated with TFP: i.e., the 
easier the access to capital, the higher a firm’s TFP.  The results show that a high 
debt-to-asset ratio is associated with a lower firm productivity level, which is 
consistent with one line of literature.  Top ten shareholder concentration has a 
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The positive relationship between financial development and total factor 
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growth path.  In addition, indices created for Chinese listed firms using a more 
comprehensive set of company factors can provide a way to predict which firms 
will be financially constrained. 
 
